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CHAPTER ONE; INTRODUCTION

According to most accounts, the largest budget reduction in American

history was enacted with the 1981 Omnibus Reconciliation Act.

The bulk

of these reductions was in the domestic transfer programs, particularly

entitlements, and yet general federal spending continued its increase

in fiscal year 1982, as did overall authority and spending for the domestic
transfer programs. Contrary to popular belief, what was reduced was the

percentage growth rate of federal budget authority and outlays in selected

programs from what they could have been, not the growth of federal spending
per se.

Much of the growth in the federal budget is associated with the con

tinuing expansion of what are called budget uncontrollables-^-interest on

the public debt, farm price supports, prior contractual obligations, general
revenue sharing and entitlements.

Uncontrollable spending——and this is

synon3nn.ous with relatively uncontrollable under existing law—has risen
from 73% of total budget outlays in fiscal 1975, to over 76% in fiscal

1981.^ The dominant form of these uncontrollables is the entitlement cate
gory. It has risen from a $32.3 billion dollar budget commitment in 1965,
to a $316.6 billion dollar obligation for fiscal 1981. The major entitle
ments have more than doubled since 1973, and many have tripled(See Tables
1-A and 1-B).

But having said all that simply puts one safely within the descriptive

perspective of the regular literature concerning United States budget de
ficits and the problems of spending controls. To understand some of the

deeper dimensions of these problems requires a focused, concentrated exa
mination of the principal issues which comprise the spending control debate.

TABLE 1_A

U.S. BUDGETARY OUTLAYS FOR HEALTH CARE. FY 1973-1985

(In Billions of Dollars)
$Billions

$Billions

100

100

__ 80

80
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^

60
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I

I

1

f
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U.S. BUDGETARY OUTLAYS FOR INCOME SECURITY, FY 1973-1985

(In Billions of Dollars)
$Billions

$Billions
-300

300'
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250

250
•

UNEMPLOYMENT

COMPENSATION

200

200

150

SOCIAL SECURITY

150

100

100
OTHER RETIREMENT AND

50

DISABILITY.

50

GENERAL PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

0.

i

1973

74

75
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SOURCE:

'

I

\

\

t

I

L

L

16

71

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

(Estimate)

The U.S. Budget in Brief for Fiscal Year 1983, Office of Management
and Budget, pp. 57, 60.
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One such issue, and the one this thesis examines, is entitlements. What

exactly are entitlements and how do they work? Why are they so difficult

to regulate financially? Once legislated, can they in fact be controlled?
If so, how?

The purpose of this thesis is to answer those questions in order to
contribute to an understanding of how and why entitlement outlays remain

such a persistent problem of control within the congressional budgetary
process—a process originally designed to give Congress the power to

control federal spending. Entitlement spending, representing nearly 50%

of annual budgetary authority and growing,^ has not been brought under
such control. Is Congress—even in cooperation with the President and further,
even without creating any new entitlements—^capable of holding down en

titlement spending? This thesis argues that without fundamental structural
change in the way entitlements are handled within the budgetary process,

Congress does not now have the capacity to control entitlement spending.
Methodology and Limitations

This thesis will utilize the style of policy analysis popularized by

the Congressional Budget Office under Alice M. Rivlin. Such style employs
a modified content analysis of government documents and other data to ascer

tain the prevailing patterns relevant to one or several issues (in this

case, entitlements); a presentation of the available plans, options, and

strategies to modify or fundamentally change those patterns, with an analysis
of the strengths and weaknesses of each option or strategy; and finally an
evaluation of a broad compilation of suggested future options and strategies,

including estimated cost factors associated with each of them.
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This methodology will be used to investigate and discuss:
(a.) The nature of entitlements within the budgetary process, in

cluding the major problems in controlling entitlement spending,

(b.) Congressional options for controlling entitlement spending in
the 1980*s.

(c.) Future strategies and options for controlling specific types of
entitlement spending.

There are several important limitations inherent in this thesis. One is

the absence of a lengthy historical perspective outside of that necessary
to properly identify entitlements and how they became such a gargantuan

budgetary problem. This thesis seeks to add to modern scholarship on whe
ther and how congressional spending can be brought back into a controlled

focus more appropriately tailored to this nation's means, resources, and
needs. Since the first moderately effective effort at putting at least a

temporary leash on entitlement spending was not enacted until the 1980
Reconciliation Act, for the purposes of this thesis, a lengthier, more
detailed historical perspective is not justified. It is enough, to note

that the political strategies^of the 1960*s and 1970's mainly sought to
expand government spending, not to reduce it; and even when those strategies
did seek fiscal restraint, entitlements were never successfully curtailed,
they just grew into bigger budgetary obligations.

Furthermore, the pre-1980'a period has already been abundantly described
within the available literature, although discussions of entitlement spen

ding were most usually seen as only one of numerous budgetary irritants

rather than a problem of special significance.^
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The second limitation is that this thesis focuses almost exclusively
on entitlements as a problem of budgetary control. It does not discuss
entitlements as an issue of class--oriented redistributive politics,
although entitlements, as a major dimension of the federal government's

transfer payment-redistribution efforts, is most certainly such an issue.^
Restrictions of scope and organization preclude such a discussion here.
The third major limitation is one of sources. Even though there has

recently been much hue and cry concerning entitlements, there is very
little primary literature available which analyzes entitlements within
the budgetary process. The preponderance of the literature that is

available is from journals like the Congressional Quarterly and the
National Journal, newspapers, and the special projects done by various
authors under the umbrella of the Congressional Budget Office publica
tions. The sources utilized in this thesis reflect that paucity.
This Thesis and the Currently Available Literature

All of the currently published literature which purports to describe,

analyze, examine or otherwise discuss the federal budget and its major
problems

mention entitlements at least once, and usually several times.

Some sources, like Ellwood's recent study of the 1981 Reconciliation Act
8

budget cuts,

spend a great deal of time describing and defining entitle

ments and other income transfer programs. Ippolito's contributions are of
9

that ilk,

as is Schick's, Congress and Money.

10

But therein lies the major

problem of entitlements within the literature; the lack of a consistent,

coherent and accurate definition/description of exactly what programs are
entitlements. This is not to say there is no standard definition—there

certainly is. Entitlements are legislated government "programs in which
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spending is governed by a law making all who meet their requirements eli

gible to receive payments,

But apparently, in so innocuous: a definition,

there is ample room for interpretation.
Thus, in Ellwood, the Food Stamps Program is an entitlement, and in at

least one major Congressional Budget Office publication, it is also iden-
12
13
tified as such,
while in another, it is not.
Ellwood, Schick and Ippo
lito all include interest on the public debt as part of what is called man

datory spending, and/or the general category of uncontrollahles. The CB,0,
14

in one study,

labels that interest as an entitlement, as does the Donnelly

special report on entitlements in a recent Congressional Quarterly,

That

same CBO report also identifies the General Revenue Sharing and Title XX

Social Service Programs as entitlements, contrary to most of the other li
terature on entitlements.

This thesis tries to make sense out of what is essentially a hodge-podge.
There are certain basic programs which, the entire literature agrees are
entitlements: Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Railroad Retirement,

Guaranteed Student Loans, Veteran's Compensation, Military Retirement, etc.
There are also quite a few arguable programs, the majority of which have
already been mentioned above. This thesis, will rely on a critical review of

CBO and 0MB sources to arrive at a consistent and hopefully accurate list
..
16
of current entitlement programs.

Beyond that identification of entitlements is the issue of congressional

control of entitlement spending within the present budgetary process. Con
trol, in this thesis, means Congress having the ability, under current law

and the structure of the budgetary process, to enact effective constraints
on the growth of federal spending for entitlements. The issue is not the
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growth of entitlement spending versus no growth of such spending; it is
the relatively unfettered, undisciplined growth versus controlled, ba

lanced growth of entitlement spending. The issue is congressional capa
city to increase or decrease entitlement spending as a budgetary outcome
associated with a deliberate plan of budgetary priorities.

Theoretically, Congress has the regular power and capacity to pass any
legislation it so desires concerning the budget, and to use any of a
variety of budgetary devices to keep programmatic spending within a dis

ciplined range and limitation. In fact, most critics, including the Reagan
administration, blame any dearth of congressional control of programmatic
spending on a simple congressional lack of will, not on structural in
capacity. However, once Congress accords programs the status of entitle

ments within the budgetary process, one practical result is that Congress

has also legislated itself a diminished power to constrain spending for
those programs. By its very nature within the present budgetary process,
entitlement spending becomes self-perpetuating and virtually automatic.
Entitlements enjoy a favored, protected status and their annual spending

totals are extremely difficult to predict. Of course. Congress can "merely"
strip an individual program of its entitlement status, as it did the Food

Stamp Program. However, that is not only a rare congressional action, it

also begs the question. Taking entitlement status from individual programs
avoids, rather than confronts squarely the issue of whether Congress can,
under current law and the present structure of the budgetary process, control
entitlement spending once programs are designated entitlements. In the last

few years it certainly has not done so, even when it has tried to, dis

crediting somewhat the view that the unfettered growth of entitlement
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spending has only been by deliberate design, rather than because of any
congressional loss of control. Again, this thesis argues that without

structural changes in the way entitlements now fit within the budgetary
process. Congress cannot control entitlement spending. It is more than
a lack of will—it is a lack of structural capacity.

CHAPTER II: AN OVERVIEW OE CURRENT ENTITLEMENTS
WHAT ARE ENTITLEMENTS AND HOW DO THEY WORK?
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A. What Are Entitlements Within The Budgetary Process?

Entitlements as income-transfer programs, obligate payments—cash or

in-kind—to beneficiaries who meet eligibility requirements established

by the authorizing legislation which creates the program. Persons become
'entitled' to program benefits when they apply and meet specified program
criteria such as an income level, age level, marital status, prior contri
butions to a trust fund, etc.

The authorization process which creates each entitlement—and indeed
2

each congressionally established federal program —not only mandates eligi

bility rules and requirements for each entitlement, it also grants unlimited
(as needed) amounts of budget authority to the entitlement, effectively put

ting annual increases for entitlements on automatic pilot. In fact, annual
outlays for entitlements are automatically determined by the numbers of
eligible applicants and the current benefit levels mandated for the program,
rather than by the appropriations process. There are two principal variations
on this theme: indexed entitlements, whose estimated expenditure increases are

annually listed in the legislated appropriations acts as a matter of course
without congressional control of their funding levels (almost without exception

supported by trust fund revenues); and appropriated entitlements, whose estimated
expenditures must technically go through the regular appropriations committee

procedures and are thus theoretically subject to annual congressional control of
3

their level of funding (supported by general revenue sources). However, in

practice, because yearly costs for all of the entitlements are fundamentally

dependent on economic conditions (e.g., inflation, high unemployment, etc.), the
numbers of eligible beneficiaries, eligibility rules and any inherent re
strictions on benefit levels,

the annual expenditure and outlay
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levels of both varieties of entitlements are determined by the authorizing

legislation, not the yearly appropriations procedures.^
The large income-transfer system which entitlements dominate consists

of two categories: social insurance programs and welfare.

The social

insurance category represents the biggest share of income—transfer ex

penditures. In fact just one social insurance program—Social Security—
6

obligated more than 20% of the entire 1982 fiscal budget.
Social insurance programs allocate cash benefits to individuals
who have contributed to the support pool of those programs through specified
taxes or other devices, and who also are aged, retired, unemployed, or

disabled, with recipient wealth or income level being irrelevant to benefits.

The single largest social insurance program and entitlement is the Old

Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Program (Social Security). The
other programs included in this category are Railroad Retirement, Civil
Service Retirement, other government retirement and pensions (e.g. Federal

Reserve Board Employees' Retirement, etc.), Federal/State Unemplo3mient

Insurance, Veterans' Compensation, disabled miners and coal-miners' benefits,

and Medicare. They are all entitlements.^
Welfare programs base benefit eligibility on needs analyses-low income

status, family composition, assets, etc.-rather than on any prior contributions
to a trust fund.

Most of the government's income-transfer programs related

specifically to poverty are in this category, including the two largest ones.
Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medicaid.

The other

eight welfare programs are Supplementary Security Income, Veterans' Pensions,
Food Stamps, Child (and elderly) Nutrition programs. Low-income Housing
Assistance, Earned Income Tax Credit, General State/Meal Assistance to the
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Needy, and the Emergency Assistance Program.

All but the Low-income
8

Housing Assistance Program and Food Stamps are entitlements.

Table II-1 shows a summary listing of these entitlements and their

outlays from fiscal years 1972-1985 (estimates).
Other entitlement programs which do not really fit into either
the social insurance or welfare categories include the Guaranteed Student
Loan Program (Special Allowances), interest on the public debt. Farm Price

Support Loans (Rice, Honey, Tobacco, Upland Cotton, Wool, Mohair), Co

mmodity Export Suspension Protection and Grants to States for Social
Services.

9

In all, there are approximately 35 inclusive federal entitle

ment program categories and 70 individual programs.
are all listed in Table

B.

10

,

The categories

II-2.

How Do Entitlements Work?

Once established into law, each entitlement program inherits a specific

constitutency, including beneficiaries, employment-related implementers and
other advocates.

Most entitlements also come into being with an indexation

or other cost-of-living adjustment device attached, which annually increases
the dollar amounts of benefits receivable in response to shifting economic

changes.

This feature is discussed in a following section. It should be

noted here, however, that while retaining some positive advantages, this
indexation/COLA characteristic is one of the distinctive ingredients making
entitlement expenditures uncontrollable.
Each entitlement is administered directly by a federal agency, state

agency or a combination of the two. Social Security and the other trust
fund entitlements are generally administered by federal agencies, and the
means-tested entitlements are either direct federal administration (e.g.

TABLE

II-l

FEDERAL OUTLAYS FOR GENERAL' ENTITLEMENTS AS INCOME-TRANSFER PROGRAMS,
FISCAL YEAR 1972 - 1986 ;

(In Billions of Dollars)
Function and
Actual

Subfunction

Estimate

1973

1974

1975

1976

TqI

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1988

1984

1;

7v3

1.9

8.2

9.2

10.3

11.9

13.7

15.0

16.5

17.7

1?

0-3

4.5

6.6

4.8

3.5

4.0

7.0

2.9

3.6

Department of Defense-Military;

Retired military personnel

4.4

Agriculture:
Farm Income Stabilization

4.1

1.5

0.8

1.6

51.7

58.6

69.3

77.2

4.5

5.6

7.0

5.4
1.6
3.6
6.2

6.1
1.8
4.4
7.9

6.5

6.8

7.9

17.3

22.3

.Income Security:

General retirement & dis

ability insurance
Federal employee retirement
and disability
Unemployment compensation
Housing assistance
Food and nutrition assistance

Other income security
Income security for veterans

Health care services

14.6

20.9 88.6

97.2 108.5 123.7 145.0 162.3 175.7 190.6 20^

8.2

2.3

9.5

10.7

13.5 19.5
2.1
2.5
6.6 : 8.0
10.1 12.2

4.0
0.7
1.8
3.1

15.3
3.0
8.5
13.0

8.4

2.1

9.2

9.7

27.5

7.2

32.3

36.7

SOURCE: The U'3. Budget; in Brief, 1983j .Office of Management and Budget,
pp. 80-83.

^

^

12.4

14.7

17.5

19.4

21.1

11.8 10.7
3.7 '4.4
8.9 10.8
13.9 13.4

18.0
5.5
14.0
17.2

19.7
6.9
16.2
19.7

25.2
8.2
15.6
20.2

22.6
8.9
13.8
19.8

10.8

11.7

12.9

14.1

42.5

50.1

60.4

68.0

22.5

24

19.8

18

9.4

9

14.0

14

18.6

19

14.8

15.4

16

72.7

79.6

88
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TABLE II-2:INCLUSIVE CATEGORIES FOR CURRENT FEDERAL ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS

1.

Federal Judiciary Survivors Benefits

14i

General Revenue Sharing

2.

U.S. Coast Guard Retirement Pay

15.

Supplemental Security Income

3.

Federal Employment Retirement and

16.

Dept. of Defense-Military
Retired Pay and Benefits

17.

Veterans' Pensions

18.

Price Support Loans for Rice,
Honey, Tobacco, Upland.Cotton,

Disability Programs
(a). Civil Service Retirement

(b).

Federal Reserve Board
Employees Retirement

(c).

CIA Retirement and Disability

(d).

Foreign Service Retirement
and Disability

4.

U.S. Presidents' Pensions

5.

U.S. Public Health Service
Commissioned Officers Retirement

6.

Federal Employment Compensation Act

7-

Special Benefits

for Disabled

Wool, Mohair

19.

Dairy Price Supports

20.

Medicare (Part A)

21.

Medicare (Part B)

22.

Medicaid

23.

Special Milk Program

24.

Food Donations-Elderly Feeding
Programs

Coal Miners (HHS)
8.

Special Benefits for Disabled
Coal Miners (Dept. of Labor)

25.

Commodity Export Suspension Protection

26.

Deficiency and Disaster Payments for
Wheat, Rice, Feed grains. Cotton Price

9.

Guaranteed Student Loan Program

Programs

(Special Allowances)
10c

Social Security: Federal Old Age
Survivors and Disability Insurance
(OASDI)

11.

Grants to States for Social Services

28.

Interest on the Public Debt

29.

Aid to Families With Dependent

Children (AFDC)

Social Security: Disability and
Hospital Insurance

12.

27.

Child Nutrition Programs

(a).
(b).

30.

Earned Income Tax Credit

National School Lunch
(Commodity Subsidy)

31.

Claims Against the Government

32.

Forest Service Assistance

National School Lunch

33.

(c).

School Breakfast

34.

Summer Food Service

(Cash Subsidy)
(e).

Interest on Refunded Internal
Revenue Collections

(Cash Subsidy)
(d).

Subsidies to Bureau of Land
Management

(Cash Subsidy)

35.

Internal Revenue Collections
and Interest for Puerto Rico

Child Care Feeding

(Commodity Subsidy)
(f).

Child Care Feeding

(Cash Subsidy)
13.

Railroad Retirement

SOURCE:

Compiled from CBO and 0MB lists contained in. Indexing With The Consumer
Price Index, 1981, pp. 23-30; Congressional Quarterly, 2/6/82, p. 193.
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Social Security) or the combination federal-state (e®g. AFDC, Medicaid),
Decreases in program funding thus will primarily impact the! federal

budget or will significantly affect both federal and state budgets.
This point is also discussed in the next chapter.

Payments are handled in a variety of ways.

Medicare, which provides

health insurance for more than 20 million 65-and-over clients, plus
3 million disabled patients, utilizes federal reimbursements for in
dividual medical costs directly to the attending medical institution

or physicians' unit.

Medicaid, financed by a state-federal matching

fund arrangement and aimed at low-income aged, blind and disabled
persons, utilizes state disbursal or medical payment stickers to
individuals, and reimbursements to nursing home and other institutional
facilities for services rendered.

-(in the form of negotiable

12

AFDC, TAA and UI send monthly cash

checks) to eligible individuals, and the

Food Stamps Program sends monthly food coupons.

Farm price support

loans, commodity purchases and direct payments to farmers are handled
by the federal Commodity Credit Corporation.

13

The General Revenue Sharing Program and the Title XX Social
Services Program make direct grants to state and local government rather
than to individuals.

Since 1981, the GRS grants have been mandated

directly to county, city and toxmship jurisdictions, and Title XX to

state-administered day care, handicapped, elderly, family planning and
other social services.

Both programs allocate their funds based on an

area's per capita income, population demographics, tax factors, etc.
Both are also capped entitlements and thus their annual expenditure
14
increases are neither unbridled nor automatic.
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The Guaranteed Student Loan Program allocates educational loan

subsidies for students whose parents make $30,000 or less. Private lending

institutions grant the loans and advance the funds, with the federal

government guaranteeing repayment.

The Child Nutrition Program annually

gives federal grants to school districts to provide subsidized lunches,
breakfasts and other food supplements to enrolled school children.

In summary, entitlement programs operate as consistent, entrenched
income-transfer devices.

Once established, they assume a structural

existence very resistant to either dismantlement or more than cosmetic

adjustment.

They become more or less "permanent" budgetary programs

which are guaranteed regular funding.
C.

Entitlements and the Budgetary Process

Before the passage and implementation of the 1974 Budget and
Impoundment Act, entitlement spending went virtually unregulated.

Congressional entitling committees were "beneficiary-centered." Their
major purpose was the production of new entitlements and increasing
benefits for existing ones.

16

This privileged status within the

congressional budget process, pre—1974, caused entitlements to be the
"fastest-growing portion of the federal budget as well as the single

most important factor in the year-to-year rise in federal spending,"

in the decade prior to the implementation of the Budget Act.^^
Currently, that status remains under the new budgetary process,

although several Budget Act stipulations seek to terminate it, at least
18

for new entitlements.

(a).

Those stipulations are:

Section 303, which prohibits either House or Senate
consideration during a fiscal year of new. revenue
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bills, spending or entitlement legislation, etc.,
before congressional consideration and adoption of
the first budget resolution for the next fiscal year.
Advance revenue and appropriations bills which
effect after the next fiscal year

take

are exempted, but

advance entitlement authorization is not.

(b).

Section 401 (a), which restricts new contract and
borrowing authority, and mandates that new entitlements
cannot become effective before the beginning of the

next fiscal year.

(c).

Section 401 (b), which mandates the referral of new
entitlement authorizations exceeding an authorizing

committee's Section 302 budgetary allocation to the
Appropriations Committee.

Within the past and present budget processes, entitlements are a

part of the congressional backdoor spending practices.

principal types are borrowing and contract authority.

The other two

All three have long

enjoyed favored status with authorizing committees and others, since they
provide convenient access for bypassing the Appropriations Committees in

getting programs funded.

19

The main aim of the Budget Act stipulations

mentioned above is to subject all three types of backdoor spending pro

grams to the discipline of the budget process, and to remove them from
special budgetary treatment.' That aim, for the most part, has been
attained more with new contract and borrowing authority programs than

with new entitlements, although one major result of the Budget Act stip
ulations has been to make proposed new entitlements, theoretically,

compete more equally with other claims on the federal budget.
stipulations do not affect existing backdoor programs.

20

The
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Utilizing the authority of these stipulations, the Budget Committees

have used procedural points of order, plus the generation of negative

publicity concerning the immediate and future costs of newly proposed
entitlements, as weapons to hold down the growth of new entitlements.

The Appropriations Committees have depended on Section 401 (b), but in
effect have only been able to prevent the proliferation of small entitle
ments through such dependence.

The Appropriations Committees have been

relatively ineffective in using 401 (b) to deal with the few large entitle
21

ments proposed since 1975.

Through some combination of efforts by the Budget and Appropriations
Committees, and other political factors, very few new entitlements have

been created since the Budget Act's implementation.

However, the real

growth in entitlement spending has been in the programs pre-dating the

Act's implementation and still currently viable, since the language of
22

the law left them as they were before: virtually unregulated.
The extent of current major entitlements and their impact on the
federal budget may be gauged from Table II-3, which shows total outlay

expenditures for inclusive categories of major entitlement programs
for fiscal year 1982.

TABLE II-3

FEDERAL OUTLAYS FOR CURRENT ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS,
FISCAL YEAR 1982

PROGRAM

TOTAL OUTLAYS

Defense

Retired military personnel pay
Operations and maintenance, claims

$ 15,037,341,000
155,477,000

Agriculture
Farm price supports

11,140,436,000

Transportation
Coast Guard retirement pay

288,000,000

Railroad litigation

552,000,000

Education, Training, Employment and Social Services
Student loan insurance

3,067,500,000

Social service grants

2,720,000,000

Health
Medinaid

17,874,000,000

Medicare supplementary insurance

15,456,000,000

Medicare hospital insurance

33,420,000,000

Income Security

Special benefits for disabled coal miners

1,094,765,000

Social Security old-age and survivors'
insurance

Social Security disability
Black lung disability
Railroad retirement

136,252,304,000
18,762,000,000
744,777,000
5,289,000,000

Federal employee retirement and disability

20,272,676,000

Unemployment compensation

23,661,672,000

Child nutrition ^

120,016,000

Supplemental Security Income

7,983,330,000

Aid to Families with Dependent Children

8,072,698,000

Earned Income Tax Credit

1,252,000,000

Veterans

Compensation and benefits
Readjustment and education

14,260,300,000
2,045,200,000

TABLE II-3(Continued)
PROGRAM

TOTAL OUTLAYS

General Government

Claims against the government

377,500,000

Fiscal Assistance

General revenue sharing

4,566,700,000

Forest service

231,841,000

Bureau of Land Management

645,800,000

Internal Revenue collections for Puerto Rico

245,000,000

Interest

Interest on the public debt

118,607,000,000

Interest on refunded Internal Revenue

Collections

1,450,000,000

* Entitlement status of some child nutrition programs in dispute.

SOURCE:

Compiled by Congressional Quarterly from February 1, 1982,
data supplied by the Congressional Budget Office. Cited in.
The Congressional Quarterly, 2/6/82, p. 193.

CHAPTER III:

THE NATURE OF ENTITLEMENT SPENDING WITHIN THE
BUDGETARY PROCESS—THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS IN
CONTROLLING ENTITLEMENTS
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Within the present budgetary process, there are three major

structural components associated with virtually all entitlements:

dexation, program interaction and the number of beneficiaries.

in

All

three^-singly and in combination—radically affect the annual increases

in entitlement spending.

They are the three components most responsible

for the lack of congressional control over the relationship between entitle
ment spending and the budget.
A.

Indexing for Inflation

Indexing is a legislated attempt to adjust automatically the
benefit- levels or eligibility criteria of a program, expressed in
current dollar terms, in order to neutralize the effects of a rise

in prices (or, what is the same thing, a steady fall in the dollar's

purchasing power).^ It is an attempt to preserve the real value
of program benefits to clients through escalators, cost—of-living
O

adjustments, etc.

Advantages of indexation include: (a)» elimin

ating the need for Congress to legislate adjustments in certain pro

grams annually or on an ad hoc basis which would unnecessarily risk

re-opening debate on the entirety of the program involved; (b).
reducing client uncertainty regarding future benefit levels; and
(c). decreasing the threat of election-year benefit increases for

political purposes.^
Major disadvantages of indexation include: (a), the increase
in the share of the U.S. budget that is essentially on 'automatic

pilot', making it much more difficult to reduce or control federal
spending; (b). the inequity inherent in providing some beneficiaries

the relative ability to keep up with inflation while wage earners have

to fend for themselves and are victimized by inflation; and (c). the
increased uncertainty because much of the budget is effectively controlled
4

by economic conditions which are very difficult to predict.

The major provisions indexed in federal programs are benefit levels,
eligibility criteria, ceilings or floors on benefits payable and formulas

for agricultural parity. The indexation of the benefit level is the most
common form of indexing, calling for a proportionate increase in the levels

of benefits payable with changes in the specific indexing measure. The
5

Consumer Price Index is the most popular index presently used.
By contrast, the indexing of eligibility criteria is principally uti
lized for programs aimed at the economically disadvantaged. Changing price

levels inevitably affect the meaning and significance of both the federally
defined poverty level, and simultaneously a designated income eligibility
standard. Thus such price changes necessitate at least a periodic adjust
ment of eligibility criteria and, consequently, the number of program

participants. While justly criticized for not accurately representing the
consumption habits of the economically disadvantaged, the CPI remains the
6

regular measurement used to adjust eligibility criteria.
Ceilings indexation is most characteristic of programs like Medicaid

and Medicare to prevent or reduce excessive claims for payments. It often
has the reverse effect, however, since there is little incentive for

health care providers to hold down medical costs in any case. Con
sequently any indexation simply helps motivate the long-time trend of
skyrocketing health care costs as a function of the health care market.

with the cap on claims reimbursements rising simultaneously with the

increase in costs(and costs are directly affected by their fees),^
The agricultural parity formula is an indexation of the relative
prices of farm goods bought by farmers compared to the prices of

goods they sell.

It is utilized to determine the annual degree of

federal support for farm incomes, but has been criticized both for

being anachronistic and self-perpetuating.

Its pricing reference

base, for example, is still 1910-1914, and both production techniques
and consumption habits, among other things, have substantially

changed since then.

It also contains a feedback component that
8

consistently inflates agricultural prices.

By fiscal 1982, at least 1/3 of federal expenditures were
directly tied to either the Consumer Price Index or other adjusters,

and over 50% of the entire budget was tied to some form of direct or
indirect indexation.

From 1966-1980, the quantity of federal pro

grams containing some form of direct indexation grew from 17 to 90.
The impact of this tendency is reflected in the fact that even a 1%
increase in the CPI will automatically result in over $2 billion

dollars of additional, required government spending, based on 1981
9
1982 current dollar values.

What Government Programs are Indexed?

The first major federal program to be directly and officially

tied to a price index was the Civil Service Retirement System in 1962.
Indexing was accomplished as a viable, efficient alternative to the pre
vious chore of laboriously repeating one-time adjustments in retirement

benefits as the cost of living changed.

This federal indexation es

tablished a strong precedent which was followed up in 1971 with the
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indexation of the Food Stamp Program, and in 1972 with the indexation

of the Social Security System, which is today the largest of all federally

indexed programs.

There was a precipitous

spurt of program indexations

after that date, resulting in at least 90 currently indexed federal

programs.

They can be divided into indexed entitlements, indexed ap

propriations, and quasi-indexed programs.

Indexed entitlements and

appropriations have their benefit levels indexed (although appropriations

remain affected also by the discretionary congressional review process).
Quasi-indexed programs either have their indexed provisions as a ceiling
or floor on program benefits payable, their indexed provisions not

being operative under certain conditions, or have components other
than benefits indexed (e.g., eligibility criteria).

An example of a

quasi-indexed program is CETA.^^ Tables III-l and III-2 show indexed entitle
ments, indexed appropriations and quasi-indexed entitlements and
appropriations.
The Impact of Indexation

The general consequences of indexation depend upon both the type

of price change occurring in the economy and the kind of measurement
used to analyze that change.

On the one hand, for example, when price

increases are across-the-board indexation can rectify or stabilize

loss of relative income parity by those on fixed or marginal incomes,

in effect reestablishing the status quo, and "preserving the initial
12

income distribution."

Indexation associated with across-the-board

price increases does not cause the percentage rates of government

spending to rise as a share of GNP.

13

On the other hand, indexation of

a relative price change causes income imbalance and redistribution.

This
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TABLE III-l. INDEXED ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS
ESTIMATED 1981
PROGRAM

DATE OF INDEXATION

OUTLAYS(IN BILLIONS)

1. Federal Judiciary Survivors Benefits

1956

0.002

2. U.S. Coast Guard Retirement Pay

1958

0.232

3. Civil Service Retirement System

1962

17.326

4. Military Retired Pay

1963

13.781

5. U.S. Presidents' Pensions

1963

(effective 1964)
6. Public Healtb Service Commis

0.0002

1965

0.077

1965

0.004

1964

Classified

sioned Officers Retirement

7. Federal Reserve Board Employees
Retirement

8. CIA Retirement and Disability
System

(effective 1966)

9. Federal Employment Compensation Act

1966

0.376

10. Special Benefits for Disabled

1969

1.057

1976

0.401

1972

140.117

Coal Miners (HHS)
11. Guaranteed Student Loan Program

(Special Allowances)

12. Federal Old Age,Survivors and
Disability Insurance (OASDI)
13. Child Nutrition Programs
National School Lunch Program

(Commodity Subsidy)
National School Lunch Program

(Cash Subsidy)
School Breakfast Program
(Cash Subsidy)
Summer Food Service

(Cash Subsidy)
Child Care Feeding
(Commodity Subsidy)
Child Care Feeding
(Cash Subsidy)

(effective 1975)
Benefits:

1973, 1975,1978
Eligibility:
1971, 1977

3.790

TABLE III-l (continued)
ESTIMATED 1981
DATE OF INDEXATION

PROGRAM

14.

Special Benefits for Disabled
Coal Miners (DOL)

OUTLAYS(IN BILLIONS)

0.922

1974

1974

15. Railroad Retirement Benefits

(effective 1975)

7.438

1974

16. Supplemental Security Income

5.296

(effective 1975)

17. Foreign Service Retirement and
Disability Fund

1976

0.174

18. Department of Defense:

1972, 1974, 1978

0.322

1979

3.844

Survivor Benefit Plan

Retired Serviceman's Family
Protection Plan—Guaranteed Minimum

19. Veterans' Pensions

TOTAL

OUTLAYS

195.159

SOURCE: Indexing With the Consumer Price Index: Problems and Alternatives,

Congreesional Budget Office (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printer, 1981), pp. 23-30.
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TABLE III-2. INDEXED PROGRAMS OTHER THAN ENTITLEMENTS, AND QUASI-INDEXED
PROGRAMS

ESTIMATED 1981
PROGRAM

CLASSIFICATION

Price Support Loans
Rice

DATE OF INDEXATION

OUTLAYS (BILLIONS)

Quasi-Indexed

1949,1954,

Entitlement

1977,1978

Quasi-Indexed

1949

0.925

1965

27.625

0.068

Honey
Tobacco

Upland Cotton
Wool
Mohair

2. Dairy Price Supports

Entitlement

3. Medicare (Part A)

Quasi-Indexed
Entitlement

4. Medicare (Part B)

Quasi-Indexed
Entitlement

5. Medicaid

Quasi~Indexed

(effective 1966)
1972

12.650

(effective 1973)
1974

16.026

Entitlement

6. Special Milk Program

Quasi-Indexed
Entitlement

7. Food Donations for the
Elderly Feeding Program
Commodity Export Sus
pension Protection

Benefits:1974

0.163

Eligibility:1973

Quasi-Indexed
Entitlement

1975

0.085

Quasi-Indexed

1977

0.0

1979

0.753

1979

3.283

1949

0.011

1949

0.486

Entitlement

Deficiency and Dis

Quasi-Indexed

aster Payments (Target
Price Programs):

Entitlement

Wheat

Feedgrains
Cotton
Rice

10. Grants to States for
Social Services

Quasi-Indexed
Entitlement

11. Overseas Station

Allowances (State Dep.) Quasi-Indexed
Appropriation
12. Overseas Station

Allowances (Defense

Dep.)

Quasi-Indexed
Appropriation
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TABLE III-2 (continued)
ESTIMATED 1981
PROGRAM

CLASSIFICATION

DATE OF INDEXATION

OUTLAYS (BILLIONS)

13. 0PM Cost-of-Llving
Allowance Program

Quasi-Indexed
Appropriation

1949

0.120

1^. Dep. of Interior

Quasi-Indexed
Appropriation

1954

0.590

15. Military Barracks and
Officer Quarters Con
struction Program

Quasi-Indexed
Appropriation

1968

0.228

16. Military Pay

Quasi-Indexed
Appropriation

1968

33.588

17. Federal Civilian

Quasi-Indexed
Appropriation

1970

38.969

(effective 1971)

Quasi-Indexed
Appropriation

(effective 1972)

Water and Power
Resources Service

Construction Program

Pay (General
Schedule)

18. Federal Civilian

Pay (Blue Collar)
19. Food Stamp Program

Indexed

1968

10.368

1971

10.954

Appropriation
20. Legal Services

Quasi-Indexed
Appropriation

1972

0.317

21. Community Services

Quasi-Indexed
Appropriation

1972

0.488

Administration,

Community Action
Operations:
Local Initiative

Senior Opportunities
State Economic Oppor
tunity
Community Food and
Nutrition

Energy Conservation
Services

Youth Sports Program
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TABLE III-2 (continued)
ESTIMATED 1981
PROGRAM

CLASSIFICATION

22. Health Scholarships:
National Health

DATE OF INDEXATION

Indexed

OUTLAYS (BILLIONS)

1976

0.038

1973

0.048

Appropriation

Service Corps
Scholarships
Indian Health

Scholarships

23. Foster Grandparents

Quasi-Indexed
Appropriation

24. Senior Companions

Quasi-Indexed

Appropriations
25. Basic Education

Opportunity Grants

26. Supplemental Educa
tion Opportunity

Indexed

(effective 1974)

1973

0.013

(effective 1974)
1974

2.353

1974

0.370

1974

0.265

Appropriation
Indexed

Appropriation

Grants

27. Senior Community
Service Employment
and Training Service

Quasi-Indexed
Appropriation

28. Lower Income Housing
Assistance (Section 8)

Indexed
Appropriation

1974

3.070

29. Community Services

Quasi-Indexed
Appropriation

1975

(Transferred

Quasi-Indexed

1976

0.024

1976

0.870

1976

0.044

Administration Energy

to another program)

Crisis Intervention
Service

30. Territorial and

International Affairs— Appropriation
Grants for the Northern
Mariana Islands

31.

Head Start

32. Follow Through

Quasi-Indexed
Appropriation

Quasi-Indexed
Appropriation

TABLE III-2 (continued)
ESTIMATED 1981
PROGRAM

CLASSIFICATION

33. Special Supplemental
Food Program for

DATE OF INDEXATION

Quasi-Indexed
Appropriation

1978

OUTLAYS (BILLIONS)

0.862

(effective 1979)

Women, Infants, and

Children (WIC)
34. National Direct
Student Loans

SOURCE: Ibid, pp.23-30.

Quasi-Indexed
Appropriation

1980

0.201
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is based on the fact that a real reduction in productive output-supply
is more often the cause of relative price changes, and the indexation

aimed at restoring the purchasing power lost through the price change
will not also restore the lack of supply. Consumers and beneficiaries
will not have the same capacity to purchase the same amount of goods
and services as before the shift in prices.

14

Indexation associated with

relative price changes thus usually pressures increased government

spending in income transfer programs since it will affect both benefit
levels and eligibility through its impact on relative parity. The auto

matic $2 billion dollar approximate increase in government spending re
sulting from a 1% change in the CPI, as mentioned earlier, could actually
be much more than that if indexed benefits rise faster than the bene

ficiaries' other income and thus cause a precipitous rise in program

participation.^^ In other words, there will be more program participa
tions once potential beneficiaries realize there is a strategic im
balance between specific program benefits and the other income available
to them.

B. Program Interaction

Currently, approximately one-half of the U.S. budget is authorized

for program expenditures providing benefits to individuals—entitlements
and programs which operate like entitlements. Simultaneously, at least,

one-half of all American households currently receive benefits from one
or more of these income transfer programs, and over one-half of those
beneficiaries receive assistance from two or more of these programs.

16

This multiple participation occurs because several federal programs are
aimed at serving different needs of people who live in similar social
conditions. In addition, benefits assistance from one program frequently
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depends on or is associated with some level of benefits from another
program. Program interaction is the combination of multiple partici
pations such that the beneficiaries of one program also receive assi
stance from another, and the receipt of the second benefits is depen

dent on the eligibility to receive the first. The extent of program
interaction depends on the benefit formulas, eligibility rules and
specific regulations of programs involved. Eligibility for Medicaid,
for example, automatically comes with eligibility for AFDC and, for

the most part, SSI. AFDC cash benefits are used to measure income for
food stamp eligibility; consequently reductions in AFDC benefits would
be compensated for, to some degree, by an increase in food stamp bene

fits and beneficiaries.^^
Generally, needs-based or means-tested programs have a higher proba

bility of interacting with both Other means-tested programs and the
social insurance programs, than the latter do with other programs. These

interactions are most usually directed one way: the means-tested programs

being affected by changes in the nonmeans-tested programs (and each other),
but not the reverse. Changing AFDC benefits then would not be expected to

change Social Security benefits more than marginally, yet Ghanging/reducing
Social Security benefits would be expected to seriously affect AFDC bene
fit levels.

While comprehensive studies identifying all of the income transfer

program interactions have not yet been done, it is definitely known that
AFDC, Social Security (including Railroad Retirement) and Unemployment
Insurance are all intimately connected with one or more of these pro
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grams: Supplemental Security Income, Food Stamps, school lunch, housing
assistance, Medicare and Medicaid.

19

This phenomenon creates the

probability of significantly large secondary effects on the budget,
and seriously complicates accomplishing real reductions in budgetary
spending.

Of the 9 programs listed above, Medicaid, Food Stamps, free/
reduced price school lunches and subsidized housing assistance use
AFDC benefits/eligibility to set their assistance levels (Medicaid

through an eligibility linkage, the other three through income linkages).

Changes in AFDC eligibility requirements and/or benefit levels would
directly affect government spending in all four programs, but by

very different degrees (See TableIII-3). The categorical eligibility
link between AFDC and Medicaid (households eligible for AFDC are

automatically eligible for Medicaid) means that gains or losses in

AFDC eligibility would also translate into eligibility gains or losses
for Medicaid recipients, even though the amount of AFDC benefits has
virtually no effect on the amount of Medicaid benefits.

By comparison,

most AFDC households are also automatically eligible for Food Stamps

(only about 75% actually apply for them), and thus changing AFDC elig
ibility will of necessity affect Food Stamp benefits.

Moreover,

the benefit levels of AFDC recipients reciprocally affects the benefit

levels for Food Stamps, such that the higher the AFDC benefits, the less

the Food Stamp benefits allocated, and vice versa.

A reduction in

AFDC benefits for those on just these two programs, would be balanced
20

by at least a 32% increase in Food Stamp outlays.
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TABLE III-3

PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING BENEFITS FROM AFDC^
THAT PARTICIPATE IN PROGRAMS THAT INTERACT WITH AFDC

Programs that Interact with

Percent of AFDC Households Receiving

AFDC

Benefits from these Programs^

Medicaid

100^

Food Stamps

., 75

Free or Reduced-Price Lunch^

'55

e

Housing Assistance Programs

SOURCES:

19

CBO estimates from March 1981 Current Population Survey (CPS) and

program data.

See, Interactions Among Programs Providing Benefits

to Individuals, Congressional Budget Office, Washington, 1982, p. 8.

a.

Aid to Families with Dependent Children

b.

Percentages cannot be added but must be considered separately.

c.

All AFDC recipients are covered by Medicaid, but not all actually
receive medical benefits.

d.

One or more children in the household regularly eat a free or

reduced-price school lunch subsidized by the National School
Lunch Program.

e.

Household lives in a housing unit owned by a public agency or

pays reduced rent subsidized through existing housing programs
of the Housing Act of 1937 (P.L. 75-412), as amended.
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Regarding free or reduced-^price school lunches(a program in which
there is a low income threshold for reduced price lunches, a lower one

for free lunches and little, if any, other variation in benefits)the

changes in AFDC benefit levels would not necessitate shifts in the
school lunch program eligibility.

That eligibility is dependent only

on incomes below 13% of the poverty line and AFDC benefit levels would
not increase drastically enough to raise the income levels to that cutoff.
Even though approximately 55% of AFDC families have children on the
school lunch program there is no high interaction between them in terms
of benefits changes.

21

The opposite is true of AFDC households also on rent or housing

subsidies.

Changes in AFDC benefit levels would directly affect their

income-determined housing payments:

an increase in AFDC benefits will

mean some slight increase (depending on the formula used) in rent/
housing payments; and a decrease in AFDC benefits, means a reduction
22

in the rent/housing fees (generally about 25-30%).

Medicare, Medicaid, SSI, Food Stamps and the housing assistance

programs all interact with or are associated through eligibility with

Social Security.

Over 80% of Social Security beneficiaries (including

Railroad Retirement) are also on Medicare, 15% on Medicaid, 9% on SSI,

8% on food stamps and 5% in subsidized housing/rental assistance (See Table
III - A).

Changes in Social Security eligibility would affect Medicare

eligibility, but the benefit levels of Medicare are not dependent on the
benefit levels for Social Security.

As for Medicaid, Social Security

beneficiaries also participating in it are eligible through income and/
or SSI participation.

Reductions in Social Security benefits can directly
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TABLE III-4:

PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING BENEFITS FROM SOCIAL
SECURITY^ THAT PARTICIPATE IN PROGRAMS THAT INTERACT
WITH SOCIAL SECURITY

Programs that Interact with
Social Security and Patterns

Percent of Social Security House
holds receiving Benefits from

of Benefits

these programs^

Medicare

83

Medicaid

15

Supplemental Security Income (SSI)

9

Food Stamps

Social Security and Food Stamps only or with
programs other than SSI and AFDC^
Social Security, Food Stamps, either SSI or
AFDC, and possibly other programs
TOTAL Food Stamps

5

T"

Housing Assistance Programs

Social Security and Housing Assistance only or

with programs other than SSI and AFDC^
Social Security, Housing Assistance, either SSI
or AFDC, and possibly other programs
TOTAL

SOURCES:

Housing Assistance

1

T

CBO estimates from March 1981 Current Population Survey
(CPS) and program data. See Interactions, op. cit., p. 11.

The term Social Security is used here to include both Old Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance OASDI) and Railroad Retirement Programs.

Percentages cannot be added, but must be considered separately.
With this .pattern of program participation, if the household also
received SSI or AFDC benefits, these would offset virtually all

changes in Social Security benefits.
d.

Household lives in public housing or pays reduced rent subsidized

by the existing housing programs of the Housing Act of 1937, as amended.

affect Medicaid eligibility by causing an income reduction sufficient
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to qualify one for SSI and Medicaid.

SSI has a dollar for dollar compensation link with reduced benefits

for Social Security.

I^at keeps this interaction from being a perfect

one-on-one offset is the 9% Social Security-SSI participation correspondence,

and the reciprocal fact that only about 50% of SSI beneficiaries are also
on Social Security.

This low percentage correspondence also affects the

Food Stamp interaction.

Approximately 12% of Social Security beneficiaries

are eligible, 8% apply-receive, and only 3% are on Social Security-Food

Stamps alone (as opposed to some combination with SSI and AFDC).

Re

ductions in Social Security benefit levels within this 3% would be

offset by approximately 20% increases in Food Stamp allocations.

For

the 5% of Social Security participants also on Food Stamps, AFDC and/
or SSI, any changes in Social Security benefits will be entirely made

up by the cash transfer programs (SSI, AFDC), and Food Stamp allocation
will be unchanged.

Interactions with the Housing Assistance programs would affect

only 5% of the Social Security beneficiaries.

The ones not also on

SSI/AFDC would receive compensatory rent/housing payment decreases with
reduction in income from Social Security benefits, and the ones on

SSI/AFDC would have those programs affect any cash reductions resulting
from Social Security benefits decreases.

25'

This interactive relationship is similar to that of the approx

imately 12% of the unemployed insurance recipients who also participate

in the Food Stamp program, and the 10% participating in the free/reduced
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lunch program. Only 9% of those Food Stamps-UI beneficiaries (9% of the
12%) would have reduced UI benefits offset by an increased Food Stamps
allocation.

The other 3% are Food Stamps-SSI-AFDC combinations and

reduced UI benefits would be compensated for by increased cash assistance
O^

from SSI or AFDC-

(See Table III-5)c

Unemployment insurance benefits also interact with the school lunch

program, but to a very small degree. Only about 1/10 of the UI recipients
are also participants in the lunch program. Shifts in UI benefit levels
would only affect those school lunch beneficiaries close to the income
cutoff threshold (130% for free lunches, 185% of the poverty line for

reduced price lunches), and the price category for school lunches is
set at the beginning of the school year, only haphazardly matching UI
benefit periods.
Interaction and Government Spending

The CBO report mentioned above analyzed the overall effect of
interactions on the federal budget by using three measures;

a hypothetical

20% spending cut in AFDC, Social Security, and Unemployment Insurance

by an across-the-board cut and an eligibility restriction. The results
were varied, showing offsetting program increases which significantly
altered the intent of the 20% cut (reducing it to a 9% cut in effect) and
other interactions which made no alterations at all of that intent.

Moreover, there was considerable variation between fedetal and state
spendings/savings reductions based on the 20% cut intended: states
received reduced savings in some instances and significant spending in
28

creases in others; the federal government did likewise.
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TABLE III-5:

PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
THAT PARTICIPATE IN PROGRAMS THAT INTERACT WITH UNEMPLOY
MENT INSURANCE

Programs that Interact with
Unemployment Insurance and

Percent of Unemployment Insurance

Patterns of Benefits

Other Programs^

Households Receiving Benefits from

Food Stamps

Unemplo3niient Insurance and Food
Stamps only or with programs other
than SSI and AFDC

Unemployment Insurance, Food Stamps,
either SSI or AFDC, and possibly other

1-3

programs

TOTAL

Food Stamps

Free or Reduced-Price School Lunch^

SOURCES:

b.

10

CBO estimates from March 1981 Current Population Survey (CPS)
and program data^

a.

10-12

See Interactions, op. cit., pp,. 12-13.

Percentages cannot be added, but must be considered separately.
One or more children in the household regularly eat a free or

reduced—price school lunch subsidized by the National School
Lunch Program.
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The across-the-board cut in AFDC benefits triggered the largest

amount of offsetting increases in interacted programs, thus insulating

AFDC recipients from an income reduction. Instead of the 20% cut
intended in government spending, CBO estimated the combined effect on

federal-state-local government at 14% reduced Spending, with state and

local government getting the full 20% in spending savings, and the
.

29 : "

federal government only 9% in reduced outlays.

■

This is because

of the way program costs are shared by the different units of govern
ment. The federal government, for instance, is responsible for the
full costs of Food Stamps and Housing Assistance, the major offsetting

programs for AFDC. 55% of each dollar cut from AFDC would be compensated

for by an increased federal spending elsewhere. (See Table I1I-6.) Food
Stamp offsets would be approximately 24% of each dollar cut from AFDC,
with housing assistance accounting for 6% in reduced rent/housing fees.
Medicaid and the school lunch program benefits would not be affected
at all. There would be little or no interactive results due to the non-

correlation between the level of AFDC and Medicaid benefits (although

all AFDC eligibles are categorically eligible for Medicaid) and the low
30

income circumstances of the school lunch program.

In fact, the across

the-board cut in Social Security, AFDC and UI benefits in general did not
cause any significant interactions in the programs using categorical

eligibility (Medicaid, Medicare) for one program as the criteria for
benefits eligibility for the other.

In addition, although the needs-based (i.e., means-tested) programs

(e.g., AFDC, Food Stamps) generally showed interactive results, not all
of them did (e.g., school lunch), and virtually none of the nonmeans-tested
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TABLE III-6

ESTIMATED BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF 20 PERCENT REDUCTION IN AFDC^ BENEFITS
IN FISCAL YEAR 1983, BY-INTERACTING PROGRAM

Interacting
Program

Increase in

Offset to

Net cut as

Interacting

Each Dollar

Percent of

Cut in AFDC

Previous AFDC

(In Cents)

Outlays, Including

Program* s
Outlays .

Offsets

(In Percents)

Medicaid

0

0

20

Food Stamps

6

24

15

0

20

Free or ReducedPrice Lunch

Housing
Assistance

19

Programs

Overall Effects, All

Levels of Government^
Effect on federal budget
Effect on state and local
budgets

SOURCE:

30

14

55

9

0^

20

CBO estimates in Interactions, op. cit., p- 18.

a.

Aid to Families with Dependent Children

b.

National School Lunch Program providing free or reduced-price
school lunch.

Household lives in public housing or pays reduced rent subsidized
by housing assistance programs.
d.

The effects on different levels of government are not additive, but
must be computed separately.

Since the federal government pays for food stamps and housing
assistance, increased outlays for these programs would not
affect state and local budgets.
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(social insurance) programs demonstrated any percentage-significant
interaction/program offsets. Social Security recipients, for instance,

most of whom do not participate much in other programs (only 16% do),
31

would receive program offsets that are, percentage-wise, quite small.
A 20% across-the-board cut in Social Security would, when adjusted for

offsets in SSI benefits (approximately 6% of every dollar cut). Food

Stamps and housing assistance (17% of each dollar per program), result
32

in an 18% cut in government spending for Social Security (See Table III-7).
It would also increase spending for SSI by approximately 20%, for Food
33

Stamps by approximately 2%, and 3% for housing assistance.

State

spending, since the states pay part of SSI costs, would increase 20%
for that program.

For UI, a 20% across-the-board cut would not be significantly offset,
since there are very few UI beneficiaries participating in other income

transfer programs. The principal compensatory offset would be Food Stamps,
which would increase its outlays by only 1%, each UI dollar decrease being

met by an average 32 cents in increased Food Stamps for the 6-9% of UI
beneficiaries also participating in the Food Stamp program. The other
34

91-94% of UI recipients would receive the full 20% benefits reduction.
(See Table III-8 .)

The 20% eligibility restriction (lowering the income limit for AFDC,

and raising the Social Security retirement ages for full and early benefits,

or increasing the UI waiting period from 2 weeks to 3 or 4, etc.) would
cause means-tested and nonmeans-tested program interactions. For Food

Stamp recipients, for instance, loss of companion AFDC, Social Security
or other such benefits acts only as another income reduction, leading to
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TABLE 1,11-7: ESTIMATED BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF 20 PERCENT REDUCTION IN
SOCIAL SECURITYa BENEFITS IN FISCAL YEAR 1983, BY
INTERACTING PROGRAM

Interacting
Program

Increase in

Offset to

Interacting

Each Dollar

Program's

Cut in Social

Outlays

(In Percents)

Security

(In Cents)

Net Cut as Percent
of Previous

Social Security

Outlays, Including
Offsets

Medicare

0

0

20

Medicaid

0

0

20

Supplemental
Security

19

20

Income (SSI)
20^

Food Stamps

Housing
Assistance

20b

Programs^

Overall Effects,
Levels of Government

Effect on federal budget

8

18.

7

19

Effect on state and

local budgets

SOURCE:

CBO estimates. See Interactions, op. cit., p. 20.

a.

The term Social Security is used here to include both Old Age, Survivors,
and Disability Insurance (OASDI) and Railroad Retirement Programs.

b.

The Offsets are small enough that the net cut rounds to 20 percent.

c.

Household lives in public housing or pays reduced rent subsidized
by housing assistance programs.

d.

The effects on different levels of government are not additive, but
must be computed separately.

e.

State spending would increase, not decrease.

State SSI benefit

costs would rise by about 0.3 percent of the amount of Social

Security outlays saved, but states would not receive any of the
savings in Social Security costs.

-39

TABLE III-8: ESTIMATED BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF 20 PERCENT REDUCTION IN

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN FISCAL YEAR 1983, BY INTERACTING
PROGRAM

Interacting
Program

Increase in

Offset to

Net Cut as Percent

Interacting

Each Dollar

of Previous Unemploy
ment Insurance Outlays,

Program's

cut in

Unemployment

Outlays

(In Percents)

Including Offsets

Insurance

(In Cents)

Food Stamps
Free or Reduced

1

19

0

20

Price Lunch^

Overall Effects, All

Levels of Government^
Effect on federal budget

3

19

3

19

Effect on state and
0

local budgets

SOURCE:

a.

CBO estimates.

See Interactions, op.cit., p. 26,

National School Lunch Program providing free or reduced-price
school lunch.
\

b.

The effects on different levels of government are not additive,
but must be considered separately.
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increased Food Stamp benefits.

But for the categorical eligibility

programs, loss of participation in one program also means loss of
participation in the second, thus producing double government spending
savings.

For AFDC, an eligibility restriction would cause this double

elimination, resulting in approximately 22% reductions (combined
federal, state, local) from the original 20%.

Reductions in the

companion Medicaid program would be larger than the Food Stamps and
housing assistance offsets, producing the larger 22% reduction.

In

the states alone, that figure would rise to 23%, and they would not

be responsible for any of the offset increases in Food Stamps and
t.

.

..

35

housing assistance.

For Social Security eligibility, interactions with Medicare, SSI
and Medicaid—the former causing additional reductions, the latter

two causing additional spending—would produce a 19% reduction from the
original 20%.

The federal government would gain from the double re

duction of Medicare and Social Security, but also pay most of the

increased Medicaid—SSI spending, while states would not gain anything
from the lowered Social Security-Medicare benefits, but would still

have to pay part of the increased SSI-Medicaid tax.

SSI spending

would increase by 20%, Medicaid by 1%, Food Stamps by 2%, housing
.36

assistance by 3%, and Medicare spending reduced by 4%. (See Table III-9.)
For UI, only Food Stamps would significantly interact with a 20%

eligibility reduction, due again to the small participation of UI
recipients in other income transfer programs. Federal Food Stamps
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TABLE 111-9: BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF CHANGING ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
TO ACHIEVE A 20 PERCENT REDUCTION IN SOCIAL SECURITY^
OUTLAYS IN FISCAL YEAR 1983, BY INTERACTING PROGRAM

Interacting
Program

Increase in

Offset to

Net Cut as Percent

Interacting

Each Dollar

of Previous Social

Program's

Cut in Social
Security

Security Outlays,
Including Offsets

Outlays

(In Percents)

(In Cents)

21

Medicare

-4

'
'
-7

Medicaid

1

: ,1

20

6

19

2

1

20b

3

1

20b

20^

Supplemental
Security

Income (SSI)
Food Stamps

Housing Assistance
Programsc

Overall Effects, All

Levels of Government^

2

Effect on federal budget

1

20^

Effect on state and
local budgets

SOURCE: CBO estimates^

See Interactions, PP- cit., p. 28.

a. The term Social Security is used here to include both Old Age,

Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) and Railroad Retirment
Programs.

b. The offsets are small enough that the net cut rounds to 20 percent,

c. Household lives in public housing or pays reduced rent subsidized
by housing assistance programs.

d. The effects on different levels of government are not additive,
but must be computed separately.

e. State spending would increase for Medicaid and SSI, but states
would riot obtain any of the savings in Social Security.
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outlays would increase 3% for every dollar of UI reduction from eligi
■

37

bility restrictions, with state expenditures not affected either way,

(See Table III-IO.)

In summary, attempting to control entitlement programs primarily
through cuts in program funding authorizations and outlays is not a

simple affair. There are few, if any, 'pure' cuts because of the inter
connectedness of both means-tested and trust-fund based programs. Be

cause of program interaction, intervening factors will continue to make

it extremely difficult to predict with any accuracy the full effect of

any single funding cut in entitlement programs. Additionally, while
indexation may be the most politically difficult of the three structural
components to control, program interaction is the most complicated and

amorphous. It will continue to frustrate attempts to control entitlement
spending through decreases in spending authority and program outlays alone.

Number of Beneficiaries

Not much needs be said about this persistent problem. Several of the

entitlement programs, particularly Social Security, Unemployment Insurance,
AFDC, Medicare, Medicaid, Supplementary Security Income, farm price sup

ports, etc., are particularly sensitive to the prevailing state of the

economy over which Congress has little control. The number of program
beneficiaries swells and decreases with depressed economic conditions and

boom times. The great expansion in the unemployment ranks was primarily

responsible for a 15% increase in entitlement expenditures between 1980-82,
38

for example.

And given the fact of program interaction and the great

probability of continued high unemployment through at least 1985, holding
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TABLE Iir-10:

ESTIMATED BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF CHANGING ELIGIBILITY

REQUIREMENTS TO ACHIEVE A 20 PERCENT REDUCTION IN
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE OUTLAYS IN FISCAL YEAR 1983,
BY INTERACTING PROGRAM

Interacting
Program

Increase in

Offset to

Net Cut as Percent

Interacting

Each Dollar

of Previous Unemployment
Insurance Outlays,
Including Offsets

Program's

Gut In

Outlays
(In Percents)

Unemployment
Insurance

(In Cents)

Food Stamps

' 3," ■ ■ ■

1

,

.

19

Free/ReducedPrice Luiich^

0

0

20^

3

19

Overall Effects, All
Levels of Government'^

Effect on federal budget

3

19

Effect on state and

0

0

local budgets

SOURCE:

a.

CBO estimates.

See Interactions, op. cit., p* 32.

National School Lunch Program providing free or reduced-price
school lunch.

b.

The offsets are small enough that the net cut rounds to 20 percent.

c.

The effects on different levels of government are not additive, but
must be computed separately.
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entitlement expenditures down will be virtually impossible without
additional eligibility and benefit level changes, similar to those
in the 1981 Omnibus Reconciliation Act. Such rules changes, however,

cannot be continually resorted to without fundamentally altering the
39

aims, intents and purposes of the programs themselves.
The number of program clients will also increase naturally as the

population grows older; as more of the "temporary unemployed" become

permanent due to the decline in manufacturing/industrial jobs and other
social-economic changes; and as the population itself continues to ex

pand. As is the case with indexation and program interaction, and possi

bly more so in this instance, the pressure of this structural problem
of entitlements will not just go away, and will consistently impact
entitlement outlays.

CHAPTER IV

CAN CONGRESS CONTROL ENTITLEMENTS WITHIN THE

BUDGETARY PROCESS? ~ THE POTENTIAL OF RECONCILIATION

As defined in the introduction, congressional "control" of
entitlements in this thesis means Congress having the ability, under
current law and the structure of the budgetary process, to enact

effective constraints on the growth of federal spending for entitle

ment programs.

In this and the following chapter, the question of

whether Congress indeed has that capacity, or has the immediate
probability of acquiring it, is explored.

During the initial years of the budget process, congressional
attempts at constraining the growth of entitlement spending were
mainly confined to Budget Committee assumptions of legislative

savings as part of budget resolutions. However, this seldom if ever
worked, since there was no real incentive for Congress to enact those

assumed savings, and much interest group pressure and other motivations

for it not to, and consequently, it very rarely did.^ Currently,
there are only two viable options available for Congress to have
control over entitlement spending.

The first option is a distinctive

component of the budgetary process itself and is the subject of this
chapter: reconciliation.

The second option has been repeatedly

mentioned throughout this thesis: structural changes in the nature
of entitlements within the budgetary process (i.e., indexation, program
interaction and number of beneficiaries, etc.).
rt

Ellwood,

Q

Schick,

A

Pechman

5

and Ippollto,

four contemporary

analysts of the budgetary process, all view reconciliation as the

principal weapon Congress currently possesses to control entitlement
spending.

What is this reconciliation procedure and what are its

^qo

strengths and limitations relative to cpntrolling entitlements?
Reconciliation as a combined series of legislative activities

inherently tied to established legislative habits, procedural rules,
standards and jurisdictions, was originally created by Section 310
6

of the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Act.

It is a legislative

process itself part of the broader budgetary process, and is,
according to the Budget Act, associated with and follows the
second concurrent budget resolution mandated for enactment no later

than Spetember 15th every year. Under the terms of the Budget Act,
reconciliation technically has two stages:

a set of reconciliation

instructions which is included in the second budget resolution, and
a reconciliation bill which summarizes the congressional implement
ation of those instructions.

Both stages must go through the

regular steps of congressional approval.^
More specifically. Section 310 authorizes, within both the
Senate and the House, each congressional Budget Committee to produce

a proposed second concurrent budget resolution which consists of the
8

specific spending ceilings and revenue floors for both budget authority,

and spending authority,^ plus recommended changes in revenue laws,
a current accounting of the public debt, and the set of instructions

directing congressional committees to report new legislation designed
to accomplish outlays within such ceilings and floors. Those in
structions specify that committees can recommend changes in the

amount of new and old (prior years') budget authority, and new spending
.
10
authority.

-m-

After congressional approval of this resolution and the instructions.
Section 310 mandates that the Budget Committees receive, compile and

summarize the reports and recommendations from the other relevant con

gressional committees pursuant to those instructions, and without sub
stantively revising them, compose these reports and recommendations
into either a reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution.

This

reconciliation proposal is then mandated for submission to the full

Congress, to be approved, including conference adjustments, by no
later than September 25th, and Congress is ordered not to adjourn
until such reconciliation activity is completed, once it has been
initiated.

Based on the Budget Act, the proposed reconciliation document's
primary purpose is to bring existing laws into conformity with current

budget policies by resolving the differences in the legislative budget
decisions made during the period between the first budget resolution's
spending—revenue targets and the second's specific ceilings and floors.
Reconciliation, according to the Act, was primarily aimed at reconciling

new and prior year budget authority (appropriations) and new entitle
ments (spending authority) with the budget limitations of the second
resolution.

Reconciliation, as mandated in the Budget Act, focuses

on reconciling laws and congressional budget policy, not program
.
modifications
per se.12

In the years since the passage of the Budget Act, particularly
since 1980, the year that Congress first implemented the reconciliation

process into its budgetary decisions, there have been several very
significant adaptations in how reconciliation works within
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the budgetary process.

(1). Reconciliation instructions have been "permanently" shifted
from the second resolution to being included in the first
resolution.

This has been the regular procedure since the

fiscal 1981 budget formulation.

13

(2). Reconciliation now focuses regularly on changing legislation
providing prior budget authority, rather than just existing

law.

It is primarily focussed on laws, not programs.

New

appropriations are now generally ignored by reconciliation,

and instead past appropriations authority and already existing
14
entitlements are the focus.

(3). According to the language of the Budget Act, neither re
conciliation nor any of the budget resolutions were to cover the
revision of conventional authorizing legislation.

Since such

legislation was still under the purview of the Appropriations
Committees, it was not originally deemed to be a problem.

However, reconciliation instructions now regularly direct
committees to recommend changes in non-entitlement authorizing

legislation, since some of it ba.sically determines the level
of some outlays when it sets up eligibility and payment require
ments for programs.

Food Stamps and disaster assistance are

examples.

(4). The Budget Act perceived congressional budgeting as an annual

process only.

Currently, for both practical and political

reasons, reconciliation is seen and used as a multiyear process.

with each budget resolution setting revenue and spending

goals for the coming fiscal year, plus the next two fiscal
or outyears.

The outyear goals are non-binding targets

, 16

only.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Reconciliation as a
Control for Entitlements

Major advantages of the current reconciliation process as it
affects entitlements include:

(a). The shift to the start of the budget process enables the Budget
Committees to literally force the review of existing entitlements

by reporting a reconciliation instruction to change previous
laws mandating entitlement programs.

(b). The fact that reconciliation can be used to require authorizing
committees to lower authorization of appropriation limits for

entitlements and Other programs provides an

effective tool

for those interests seeking to limit entitlement spending.

18

(c). The fact that the reconciliation process causes a significant
shift in the traditional congressional bias towards more

spending for programs by focusing the congressional debates
onto issues that affect revenue—spending totals—the whole

budget—rather than individual programmatic concerns.

19

The major disadvantages of the current reconciliation process
as it affects entitlements include:

(a). The fact that the reconciliation process increases budgetary
uncertainty by motivating heightened legislative conflict amid

a large number of congressional activities.

In the 1980 re
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conciliation process at least 20 congressional committees
were involved, and in 1981, 30. Because there are so many

legislative activities requiring manipulation and organization
in the reconciliation process, it can rather easily be blockrd,
stalled or substantially slowed down at any number of points.
Additionally, entitlement programs previously established as
relatively permanent guarantees of continually expanded funding
and benefits have lost some of that stability, forcing their

interest groups and congressional supporters to fight harder
to defend them.

20

(b). The fact that the reconciliation process depends primarily on

changing prior authorizations and rules of eligibility for en

titlement programs for its effect on them means that the process
is inherently limited in how many times such amending, revising
and alterations of entitlement laws can be accomplished without

substantially changing the nature, intent, goals and purposes
of the entitlements.

(c). The fact that much of the budget remains heavily dependent on

and influenced by the prevailing state of the economy and the

demographic vagaries of our current society. Federal receipts and
obligations remain tied to automatic responses to high unem

ployment, growth in the incidence of poverty, the numbers
of elderly, indexation of cost of living adjustments, other
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beneficiary characteristics, inflation, etc.

Thus reconcili

ation alone cannot ensure a decline in the levels of govern
ment spending in general, or fot entitlements in particular.
The process will have.to be accompanied by structural changes
in indexing, program interaction and other budgetary elements
in order to evolve from a potentially consistent vehicle for
controlling entitlement growth to an actual one.
The next section examines the budgetary outcomes for entitlements

through the reconciliation process since 1980.

The economic assumptions

used as the basis of the estimated savings are shown in Table
IV-1 .

Reconciliation and Entitlements:

1980 - 1983 Outcomes

1980

The 1980 Omnibus Reconciliation Act has been called, "the first

coherent effort any Congress has made to bring this so-called 'uncontroll
21

able* spending under control.*'

The first budget resolution to which

it was attached had called for $10.6 billion in savings, and although

it officially resulted in $8.28 billion —$4.6 billion in outlays and

$3,645 in new revenues —much of which was either temporary, predominantly
paper cuts or both, the effort was judged a very successful precedent.

It utilized the devices of tightening some ehtitlement eligibility

rules (e.g., the school lunch program), reducing farm support subsidies,

tightening extended unemployment benefits, postponing and/or limiting
Medicare and Medicaid hospital pa5anents, shifting programs to offbudget status and reducing interest subsidies and COLAs, among bther
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things.

22

Its final version, passed December 3, 1980 (two months

after the fiscal year had begun), included the following results
relative to entitlements.

(1). It authorized extended funding for two child nutrition programs-
one of them, the supplemental feeding program for women, infants
and children until 1984— based on amendments which were part
of neither the House nor Senate reconciliation bills, but

were added during the congressional conference period.

This

authorization could have been overturned on a point of order

but no one officially challenged it for fear of upsetting the
delicate balanced achieved.

In effect, it legislated an

action already pending in a bill due to go to the appropriations
23

committee, making the latter moot.

(2). Authorized $840 million in budget authority savings and

$826 million in outlays by lowering subsidies for some other
child nutrition programs, reducing the number of non-lower

income eligibles for school lunch programs, tightening

collection procedures and increasing student loan interest
rates, and limiting COLAs for Federal Employees Compensation
Act benefits to once a year rather than twice.

(3). Authorized $429 million in budget authority savings and $463
million in outlays by repealing double-dipping COLAs by

retiring federal employees, but maintained twice-a-year
regular COLAs for military and federal retirees.

(4). Authorized $12 million in budget authority savings and
$915 million in outlays by deferring the periodic interim
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TABLE IV-1: COMBINED ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

AND THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CALENDER YEARS 1981-85

Projected
Economic indicator

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

Percent change, year to year
GNP in current dollars

Reagan administration
Congressional Budget Office

11,3

8.1

11.5

10.2

9.7

11.3

7.5

11.9

10.4

9.7

CNF in constant 1972 dollars

Reagan administration
Congressional Budget Office
GNF deflator
Reagan administration
Congressional Budget Office

Consumer price index
Reagan administration
Congressional Budget Office

2.0

0.2

5.2

5.0

4.7

2.0

-0.1

4.4

3.6

3.5

9.1

7.9

6.0

5.0

4.7

9.1

7.5

7.3

6.6

6.0

10.3

7.3

6.0

4.6

4.8

10.3

7.5

6.9

6.9

6.4

Percent, annual average

Unemployment rate
Reagan administration
Congressional Budget Office

7.6

8.9

7.9

7.1

6.4

7.6

8.9

8.0

7.4

7.2

Treasury bill rate
Reagan administration
Congressional Budget Office

14.1

11.7

10.5

9.5

8.5

14.1

12.0

13.2

11.3

9.4

Source: Budget ofthe United States Government. Fiscal Year 1983. pp. 2-5. 2-7;and Congressional Budget Office.
The Prospectsfor Economic Recovery,report to the Senate and House Committees on the Budget,part I(Government
Printing Office, 1982). p. xviii.

Cited in, J.A. Pechman, ed.,Setting National Priofitdes; The

1983 Budget (Brookings: Washington, D.C.)^ P- ^0
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payments made to hospitals to once in September, and altering '
the Medicare reimbursement schedule to recognize costs-per

service-performed rather than costs-per-claim-processed.
At the same time, increased spending was authorized for health

program expansions for home services, outpatient rehab care
and physical therapy.

(5). Authorized $32 million in budget authority savings and $147
million in outlays through rescinding the government pajnnent

to the states in reimbursement for unemployment aid to laid-off

CETA workers; terminating

government reimbursement procedures

for at least the first week of extended benefits in states

not requiring applicants to wait until after week one to
receive benefits, and tightening eligibility requirements
for extended unemplojnnent compensation.

(6). Authorized $117 million in budget authority savings and $270
million in outlays by restricting retroactive Social Security
benefits to no more than 6 months prior to eligibility application;

and by repealing Social Security disability eligibility for
convicted felons; postponing implementation of new rules for

day care centers; enacting the 1980 Social Security Disability
Amendments; and transferring trust funds from the disability

category to the old age and survivors' categories within the
OASDI trust fund.

Overall what the 1980 Reconciliation Act did was to establish

the congressional precedent for effectively using the process to shape
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and mold relative control of entitlement expenditure increases.

It

did not definitely establish the full range and scope of the process'
potential viz-a-viz entitlements, but it did show the process' promise
as an invaluable tool, along with some of its limitations.
1981

The 1981 Omnibus Reconciliation Act provided a very ambitious pre

cedent for the scope of the reconciliation

process.

It included re
24

visions for at least 250 federal programs and 232 program accounts.

It also provided a more definitive exposition of the capacity of the
reconciliation process, in executive branch and congressional hands,

to cope better with entitlement spending.

It again demonstrated the

multidimensionality of the difficulty of holding down federal entitle

ment expeditures: in spite of presidential and some congressional
rhetoric to the contrary, entitlement spending for fiscal 1982 and
1983 (estimated) still increased by double digit percentage points
25

over fiscal 1981.

Indexation, program interaction and the numbers
26

of eligibles had a great deal to do with those uncontrolled increases.
The 1981 Reconciliation Act was passed on July 31.

It was part

of a broader process that year to hold down not just government

spending but to cut and reduce expenditures substantially.

The

three-pronged attack utilized by Congress to accomplish this feat

included rescission of prior appropriations, reconciliation, and
appropriations reductions.

For conventional authorizations and

indexed appropriations (e.g. Food Stamps, etc.) minimum cut savings
were achieved in the first stage by amending the authorization of
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appropriations limits for targeted programs previously budgeted (re
scission)^ and in the second stage, deeper cuts were made by the

appropriations committees' granting of budget authority even further
■ 27

below the amended authorizatiQn of appropriations limits,^

Approximately 4Q% of the budget authority reduction and 39%
of the outlay savings contained in the Act were achieved throughamending entitlement authorization^ of income assistance programs

so that eligibility rules and benefit formulas were substantially
modified.

These were actual and permanent cuts.

Appropriated en

titlements had both their original authorizations: amended, and ap
28

propriations coiimittee reduGtion of their budget authority..

Relative to entitlements, the 19.81 Reconciliation Act included the
following,

1).

It authorized the amendment of the Higher Education Act to

affect eligibility criteria for the Guaranteed Student Loan program
so that $30,000 is a relative income barrier beyond which, students
may be deemed ineligible.

In addition, reconciliation raised interest

rates in the parent loan subsidiary to the GSL, established a loan

origination fee of 5Z which was to be paid by each student borrower,
reduced the special allowance payment to lenders, and revised some

regulations for the Student Loan Marketing Association.

Overall,

some $479 million in budget authority savings were claimed for fiscal
29

1982, $844 million for 1983, and $1,353 million for fiscal 1984.
2)_.

It authorized that the Title XX Social Services program be

merged with two smaller Title XX programs. It also allowed $2.4
billion dollars for fiscal 1982 ( a 23% cut of $698.7 million).,

$2.45
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billion for 1983 (with a 24% cut in budget authority), and 2.5 billion
for fiscal 1984 (with a 25% cut of $811,5 million). . Some administrative

requirements were dropped and eligibility rules were broadened (e.g.,
the requirement that 50% of funds be used for welfare recipients was

repealed).

Otherwise the major effect of reconciliation on this

state entitlement was to give states complete control over the programs,
30

and with no state matching fund requirement.

3).

Authorized increased state discretion over hospital reimbursements

for Medicaid, and other operations within the program, thereby reducing
the federal responsibility for Medicaid program activity. .The Act
also extended Medicaid coverage to home and community facilities,
authorized the states to define their own medical needy, and revised

several administrative provisions.

There was a restriction of AFDG .

client categorical eligibility and a reduction in federal matching

requirements. The net effect of all this was to reduce federal Ifedicaid
31

expenditures by an estimated 5% each year from fiscal 1982—84.

■

4). For Medicare, the Act increased the deductible beneficiaries

are required to pay for Medicare universal hospital insurance, authorized
a reduction in reimbursement rates for hospital and home health care,

and rescinded medicare coverage payments for new procedures which had
not yet been implemented.

For the supplementary medical insurance

portion of Medicare, the deductible was increased and carryover de—
ductibles from one year to the next were prohibited.

Together, these

changes are estimated to have reduced Medicare expenditures by $491
million for fiscal 1982, or 3% from what they would have been, according

to CBO current policy baseline estimates.

Medicare costs had risen

by over 45% just between 1979-81, and cutting them remains a Reagan
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.
32
priority.

5).

It authorized restricted eligibility and reduced benefits for

the Trade Assistance Adjustment program, and introduced regulations

seeking to redirect the program's emphasis on cash assistance to
funding for employment searches and relocation.

These changes caused

an 85% reduction for fiscal 1982, with 82% scheduled for 1983 if the

program is not completely eliminated as the Reagan proposal has
33

requested.

6).

It authorized restricted eligibility for unemployment compensation

extended benefits and charged higher interest rates for federal loans
to states in an effort to discourage bailout activity.

The effort

achieved only minimal and temporary savings, however, reducing expenditures

by 1% in 1981, 4%
7).

34

for 1982, and 1% estimated in 1983-84.

It authorized large budget authority reductions in the Special

Milk program by reducing the eligibility of participating institutions
(especially private schools) for subsidies, restricting the income
criteria for individual eligibility, and eliminating the overlap with
the national lunch, breakfast, commodity-only and child care food pro

grams.

Estimated reductions were $100 million a year; a 75% reduction.

The program has been being reduced since 1978, and is proposed for
35

elimination in fiscal 1983.

8).

It authorized very large reductions in the child nutrition programs,

amounting to $1.4 billion in fiscal 1982, $1.5 billion in 1983, and

$1.6 billion in 1984.

These were achieved by restricting eligibility

for free and reduced-price lunches and lowering overall meal subsidies.
In the school lunch program, for example, the free meal subsidy was

reduced

by 3%, reduced-price lunches by 23% and full-price lunches

by 34%.^^
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9). For Supplemental Security Income, the Reconciliation Act autho

rized only small eligibility-restriction reductions, including the
elimination of the Social Security minimum benefit category, which
has since been reversed.

10). For AFDC, the Act authorized increased work requirements for
beneficiaries, tightened the rules for counting earnings by AFDC
recipients, altered the formulas for calculating income, restricted

categorical eligibility provisions, streamlined program admini
stration and decreased administrative costs. The estimated savings

was $1.1 billion, with approximately 18% of AFDC families and 19% of
38

the children losing eligibility for the program.

'

What was the general effect of the reductions in entitlements?
There was a $11.3 billion cut in fiscal '82 entitlement outlays, and
$37.2 billion estimated over three years. But these were the rela

tively "easy" cuts that will not soon be repeated or matched. For
reconciliation to really make a significant impact on the entitlement

problem, more of the 1981 activity would have to be re-done continually
arid consistently, and in all probability, that will not happen in the
foreseeable future. For example, for fiscal 1982-83, the Reagan admini

stration requested such additional cuts, but Congress rejected them.
This kind of effort to gain control of entitlements through annual pro

gram alterations and adjustments is expected to generate increasing
political opposition almost inevitably, and should not be relied upon
39

as the major strategy for gaining control of entitlement spending.
1982

The fiscal 1983 Reconciliation Act was far less sweeping than the

previous year's

and affected entitlement benefits and eligibility only

slightly. It revised COLAS for government retirees, reduced farm program
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supports, slightly modified veterans' benefits. Medicare and Medicaid,
and further restricted AFDC, SSI and UI benefits. The estimated cuts for

each year of the multiyear 1983-85 period were $4.1 billion for the
cost-of-living adjustments, $4.2 billion in farm subsidies, $552 million

from veterans' programs, $13.3 billion for Medicare, $1.14 billion for
Medicaid, $343 million for AFDC, $386 million for SSI, and $17 million
for

1). The Act authorized a new .5% user fee on VA-supported home loans, a
delay in some compensation and veterans' benefits, a rounding off of
benefit checks to the next lowest rather than next highest dollar, and a
I

change in the date for new benefit reductions coming from a transition in
41

dependency status.

2). Authorized, for the first time, a significant 50% reduction in COLAS

for younger federal retirees (under 62 years old), delayed by one month
the effective date of COLAS (from March 1 to April 1, 1983, May, 1984, and
June, 1985), and eliminated double-dipping by military retirees who take
other federal civilian jobs. Additionally, the Act authorized rounding

benefit payments to their lowest dollar, delaying the date of payment of

a retiree's first check, modifying other disability and early retirement
regulations and adjusting the computation of military service into civil
service retirement benefits.

3). It authorized a multiyear reduction in the wheat, feed grain and rice

programs estimated at $274 million dollars by requiring new payments to
farmers for not growing them; and it authorized a cut in the support of
43

dairy prices unless production was reduced.

4). For Medicare, the savings authorized were from establishing new limits

on hospital reimbursement rates and the dates for federal payments. For
Medicaid, the anticipated savings were from modifying certain provisions
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allowed to state discretion (e.g. permitted states to charge nominal
Z).

fees, to certain Medicaid patients, etc.)*

The estimated savings for Medicare, Medicaid, AFDC, Supplemental

Security Income and Unemployment Insurance, were all included in the

1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act.

This document was the

response of the House Ways and Means Committee, and the Senate Finance
Committee, to their fiscal 1983 reconciliation instructions.

These

two committees have jurisdiction over most of the entitlement programs

in the budget. Although, passed in a seemingly separate legislative

activity, the Tax Equity Act was just another part of the reconciliation
45

process for fiscal 1983.

5). The Reconciliation Act authorized first month prorating of AFDC
benefits based on the date of application, a rounding off of benefits,
to the lowest dollar, an exclusion of families of absent military

fathers from AFDC eligibility, a permission for states to require

participants to look for work, and a requirement that the income of
unrelated adults living with AFDC beneficiaries be added into the
46

calculations for benefits.

6). For SSI, the same proration and rounding off of provisions as
in AFDC were authorized, along with a one-month, benefit reduction

associated with a COLA for Social Security payments, and an exclusion

of burial spaces as countable assets. For UI, jobless benefits were

extended, increasing outlays rather than reducing spending, rounding
off of benefits to the lowest dollar was permitted, students enrolled

in a fulltime work-study or internship program were exempted from
FUTA taxes, and permission was granted to deny UI compensation to
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certain non-teaching, non-research or non-administrative staff of
■ 47

colleges and universities.

Were Entitlements "Controlled" Through the Reconciliation Process, 1980-83?

Table IV-2 shows that for each year the Reconciliation Act was enacted

as a part of the budgetary process, overall entitlement spending still in
creased significantly, as did the percentage of entitlement spending in
the budget. What can be said of the overall effect of the reconciliation

process reductions in entitlement spending for the 1980-83 period is that

the growth rates for the "other" entitlement categories (the means-tested
programs most deeply affected by the 1980-83 budget cuts) seem to have
been abated somewhat for the near future. However, this statement does

not apply to either Unemployment Insurance outlays, SSl or Food Stamp

outlays, all of whose growth rates increased between 1 and 9 billion/year
from 1980-83. See Table IV-3.

Additionally, nothing accomplished through reconciliation 1980-83

significantly affected either Social Security outlays or Medicare/
Medicaid expenditures. Thus far, all three remain impervious to bud
getary restraints.
Has reconciliation thus far resulted in increased congressional con

trol over entitlement spending in the budget? For certain programs, like
child nutrition, guaranteed student loans and AFDC, the answer is at best
mixed. For the majority of entitlement programs, particularly the gigan
tic Social Security and health programs, the answer is decidedly no.

Again, there are structural®factors of entitlements which, unless fun

damentally changed (as opposed to cosmetic, haphazard modifications),
will consistently foil even the best intended congressional attempts at
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controlling entitlement spending, even given the immense potential of
the reconciliation process.
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TABLE IV-2;

COMPOSITION OF FEDERAL SPENDING, 1980-1988

1980

Category

1982

1983

1988

1984

As a Percent of GNP
5.3

6.2

6.7

6.9

7.5

4.5
1.9

5.0
2.2

5.3
2.4

5.1
2.4

4.9

0.1
4.0

0.4

0.6

0.1

3.7

3.9

0.3
3.4

10.5

11.4

12.1

11.2

10.7

Nondefense Discretionary
Spending

5.5

4.6

4.5

4.4

3.8

Net Interest

2.0

2.8

2.7

2.7

2.8

-0.8

-0.9

-1.0

-1.0

-0.9

22.5

24.0

25.0

24.3

23.9

National Defense

Entitlements and Other

Mandatory Spending
Social Security benefits
Medicare and Medicaid

Farm price supports
Other entitlements
Subtotal

Offsetting Receipts
Total

3.0
2.7

As a Percent of Total Outlays
National Defense

23.6

25.7

26.7

28.5

31.3

20.1

21.0

21.1

20.3

9.5

10.1

12.4

Entitlements and Other

Mandatory Spending
Social Security benefits
Medicare and Medicaid

8.4

21.0
9.2

Farm price supports

0.5

1.6

2.2

1.1

0.4

17.6

15.5

15.6

14.0

11.5

46.6

47.1

48.2

46.3

44.6

24.5

19.1

18.2

18.0

16.1

9.1

11.6

10.9

11.2

11.7

-3.7

-3.7

-4.0

-4.0

-3.6

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Other entitlements
Subtotal

Nondefense Discretionary
Spending
Net Interest

Offsetting Receipts
Total

SOURCE;

CBO, Deficits, 1983, op. cit., p. 12.
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TABLE IV-3

FEDERAL OUTLAYS FOR "OTHER ENTITLEMENT" PROGRAMS **
(In billions of dollars)

Actual

Major Program

1980

Estimated

1982

1983

198^

1985

1986

1987

1988

2^.3

33.0

27.8

26.5

26.1

25.9

25.6

Benefits for Individuals

Non-Means-Tested Programs
Unemployment
Insurance

16.^

Trade Adjustment
Assistance

Veterans' Compensation
Black Lung .
Railroad Retirement b/

1.7

0.1

0.1

0.1

a/

a/

a/

a/

7A

9.3

9.9

10.2

10.6

10.9

11.2

11.3

1.8
^.7

2.0
5.3

1.8
5.7

1.8
5.9

1.8
6.0

1.8
6.2

1.8
6.3

1.8
6.4

Means-Tested Programs
AFDC c/
551 d/

7.3

8.0

8.1

8.^

8.5

8.8

9.1

9.5

7.7

8.6

7A

8.1

8.4

8.6

9.6

Veterans' Pensions

6.^
3.6

3.9

3.8

3.7

3.7

3.6

3.5

3.5

Food 5tamps e/

9.1

11.0

12.^

12.2

12.5

13.1

13.5

13.8

1.^

3.0

Partially Means-Tested

Programs f/
Guaranteed 5tudent
Loans

Child Nutrition

^.7

2.5

2.6

2.9

2.8

2.6

2.5

^.6

4.9

5.2

5.4

5.7

6.0

Public Service Grants for
States and Localities
General Revenue

Sharing

6.9

^.6

^.6

^.7

5.0

5.2

5.5

5.7

2.8

2.6

2.5

2.5

2.6

2.7

2.7

2.7

75.5

87.^

97.6

92.2

93.4

95.0

96.4

98.4

Title XX Social
Services
Total

a.

b.

Less than $50 million.

About 60 percent of outlays for Railroad Retirement provide Social Security benefits for
retired railroad workers.

c.

AFDC estimates include the Child Support Enforcement program.

d.

Fiscal years 1983 and 1988 include 13 months of benefits; fiscal year 198^ includes 11
months.

e.

Estimates include nutrition assistance for Puerto Rico.

f.

These programs, while partially means-tested, do serve some higher-income households.

SOURCE: CBO, Deficits^ 83, op. cit. p ^^2^3
This table also used as TABLE V-7 in next chapter.

CHAPTER V: CAN ENTITLEMENTS BE CONTROLLED UNDER THEIR PRESENT
STRUCTURES WITHIN THE BUDGETARY PROCESS?
PRESENT AND IMMEDIATE-FUTURE STRATEGIES
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Chapter IV identified two available options necessary for Congress to
constrain the growth of spending for entitlement programs. Reconciliation,

one of those options, has several limitations which restrict it from being
the panacea device Congress needs to enact such dontrol (.See p.51),The other,
making structural changes in the nature of entitlements within the bud
getary system, also is limited by the political dynamics of congressional
activity and tradition. Alone, neither option has much chance of succeeding.
Combined, reconciliation provides the necessary access and opportunity
within the budgetary process for significant structural changes to be made,
and the impetus for such changes adds the ingredient needed for reconciliation
to become the effective procedural device for controlling entitlements that
its proponents say it can.

In order to demonstrate the viability of that assertion, this chapter

discusses, in some detail, the majority of the current and immediate-future

strategies being considered and/or implemented to constrain entitlement
spending,and their cost implications as a measurement of their potential to
control entitlements. It is a given that reconciliation and the budget
process are the vehicles through which any of these strategies would be
implemented.

Both the 0MB and the CBO have done recent studies analyzing strategies
to reduce entitlement spending.

Both sets of strategies and the economic

assumptions they are based, on provide the data for the discussion here.

Additionally, both the CBO and the President's National Commission on Social
Security Reform have analyzed the nature and future of the biggest entitle

ment of all in the federal budget: Social Security. Though some of the
strategies they both discuss are similar, they too are based on different

economic assumptions, on the one hand, and the CBO's analysis seems to
incorporate more structured change options than does that of the Commission,^
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on the other. Table IV-1 from the preceding chapter shows the relevant
economic assumptions for the CBO and the 0MB analyses. The assumptions
for the National Commission study on Social Security are shown in Table
V-1. It includes three alternative assumptions: optimistic, intermediate

and pessimistic, plus their consequences. Additionally, assumptions in
II-A of the Table, for the years 1981-87, are updated versions of the

Reagan administrations's economic assumptions for fiscal 1983.
This chapter discusses most of the entitlement categories defined in
earlier chapters of this thesis. The interest on the public debt is not
included since there are presently few, if any, strategies being con
sidered to control it, other than reducing the federal deficit in general.
I. Social Security

There are two cash benefit sections of Social Security: the OASI and

DI (Disability Insurance).^ Together (as OASDI) they account for more
than 20% of the entire federal budget, and more than 40% of the costs
2

of all of the government programs providing benefits to individuals.
The other two trust funds comprising Social Security are the Hospital
Insurance Trust Fund (HI), and the Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust

Fund (SMI). The OASDI and HI funds are primarily financed through payroll

taxes, and the SMI by the Treasury through the General Fund and enrollee
premiums.

The problems of Social Security financing principally concern OASDI

funding and are mainly twofold: the short-term difficulty resulting from
a steady increase in benefit payments continually exceeding concomitant
increases in payroll tax revenues; and the long-term difficulty of a
3

major increase in the retirement population projected for the near future.
The short-term imbalance between outlays and receipts is a consequence

of the economic crises of the late 1970's and 1980's and their reflections
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TABLE V-1:THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM—
SELECTED ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS BY ALTERNATIVE. CALENDAR YEARS
1960-2060

Average annual percentage increase
Average

Average
Average

wages m

employ
Calendar year

annual

Real-wage

annual in

unemploy

Consumer

differential'

terest rate*

ment rate*

(percent)

(percent)

covered

Real GNP'

ment

prico index

(percent)

4.0
4.4
.2
3.4
5.7
-.6
-1.1
5.4
5.5
4.8
3.2
-2

3.4
5.4
4.9
4.9
73
6.9
7.4
6.6
•8.2
'8.0
'8.2
'8.8
•8.6

1.3
3.4
5.9
4.3
3.3
6.2
11.0
9.1
5.7
6.5
7.6
11.4
13.5

2.0
-1.0
.6
4.0
.7
-3.6
-2.5
*2.5
'1.5
*.6
'-2.6
'-4.9

3.7
5.2
7.3
6.0
5.9
6.6
7.5
7.4
7.1
7.1
8.2
9.1
11.0

5.7
3.8
4.9
5.9
5.6
4.9
5.6
8.5
7.7
7.0
6.0
5.8
7.1

•2.1
1.1
5.6
5.4
5.1
4.8
4.6
4.4
4.2
4.0
3.4
^3.5

8.8
8.2
7.3
7.5
7.0
6.7
6.4
6.1
5.7
5.2
4.5
4.5

10.3
6.3
5.9
4.6
4.2
3.8
3.4
3.0
2.6
2.2
2.0
2.0

-1.5
1.9
1.4
2.9
2.8
2.9
3.0
3.1
3.1
3.0
2.5
2.5

13.3
12.7
10.3
7.8
6.6
6.0
5.7
5.6
5.4
5.3
5.1
5.1

7.6
8.6
7.4
6.5
5.8
5.4
5.0
4.8
4.6
4.3
4.0
4.0

•1.9
.3
5.2

8.8
8.6
6.3
5.6
7.4
7.3
7.1
7.1
6.6
6.0
5.0
5.0

10.3
6.8
6.0
4.6
4.8
4.6
4.5
4.3
3.9
3.5
3.0
3.0

-1.5
1.8
.3
1.0
2.6
2.7
2.6
2.8
2.7
2.5
2.0
2.0

13.3
13.4
12.1
10.8
9.8
8.2
6.7
6.4
6.2
6.0
5.6
5.6

7.6
8.9
7.9
7.1
6.4
5.8
5.3

8.6
6.6
8.1
8.1
6.9
6.8
6.6
6.6
6.4
6.0
5.5

10.3
6.9
7.9
7.4
6.6
5.8
5.5
5.3
4.9
4.5
4.0
4.0

-1.7
-.3
.2
.7
.3
1.0
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5

13.3
13.0
11.4
9.3
8.0
7.1
6.8
6.6
6.5
6.4
6.1
6.1

7.6
9.1
8.5
8.0
7.7
7.4
7.1
6.8

10.3
7.2
9.6

-1.7
-.9
-2.3

, 13.3

9.6

-1.8
.0

Past expenence:
1960-64
1965-69
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

.

..

5.8

1975..
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Altematrve 1:
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

.

1988
1989
1990....
1995
2000 & later
Alternative II-A*:
1981
1982
1983

1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1995
2000 & later
Alternative II-B:
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1995
2000 & later

5.0
4.8
4.4
4.3
4.1
3.9
3.7
3.0
^3.1
•1.8
-.8
4.2
3.3
3.0
3.0
3.0

_

^

3.0
3.0
3.0
2.5
'2.6

Alternative 111:
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1995
2000 A later

•1.8
-1.5
.6
2.5
3.8
2.9

Z7
2.7
2.7
2.7
1.8
'2.1

5-5
8.6
6.3
7.3
7.8
9.2
9.1
8.7
8.5
8.3
8.0
6.2
6.0

9.2
8.8
8.4
8.0
7.6
7.2
5.2
5.0

2.1

.3
.3
.5
.7
.8
1.0
1.0

13.1
12.3
10.5
9.4
8.8
8.3
8.1
7.8
7.6
6.7
6.6

5.2
5.1
5.0
5.0

5.0

6.4

6.1
5.0
5.0

7.6
9.3
9.8
9.6
8.8
8.4
8.0
7.7
7.3
6.9
6.0

-6.0

'The real GNP(Gross National Product)is the total output of goods and services expressed in constant dollars.

TTie difference between the percentage increase in average annual wages in covered employment and the percentage
increase in the average annual CPI.

TTie average of the interest rates determined in each of the 12 months of the year for special public-debt obligations
issuable to the trust funds.

•The ultimate rates are adjusted by age and sex based on the total labor force aged 16 and over as of July 1. 1970. Rates
shown for earlier years are civilian unemployment rates for those years.
*Preliminary.

•The actual value of the 1981 increase in real GNP was 2.0 pcrcenL This value was not available at the time the cost
estimates were prepared; the cost estimates were based on the assumed increases in real GNP shown under the four
alternatives.

This value is for the year 2000. The annual percentage increase in real GNP is assumed to continue to change after
2000 under each alternative to reflect the dependence of labor force growth on the size and age-sex distribution of the
population. The percentage increases for 2060 are 3.4, 2.3, 2.1, and 1.0 for alternatives I, II-A. II-B, and HI. respectively.
•The economic assumptions in.alternative II-A for 1981-87 are identical to or derived from the assumptions underlying
the President's 1983 Budget, with the exception of the assumed 1981 increases in the nominal wage and the real wage as
well as the assumed 1982 increases in the real wage and the CPI, all of which have been adjusted to reflect actual
experience available since the Budget assumptions were released.

Assumptions 1= Optimistic Assumptions
Assumptions 11= Intermediate Assumptions
Assumptions 111= Pessimistic Assumptions
SOURCE: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SOCIAL

SECURITY REFOPM, January, 1983. Appendix K, page 82,
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in the numerous cost-of-living adjustments, but not in the wages of
workers. Unchanged, the deficit trend for the OASDI fund alone is pro
4

jected at $10.8 billion/year.

The long-term problem is more demo

graphic than strictly economic, with the very age structure of the
American population projected to change by the early decades of the
21st century, combined with a fundamental decline in workers contri
buting to-Social Security relative to beneficiaries estimated by
5

2030.

As previously mentioned, the reconciliation cuts during 1980-82
affected Social Security outlays by a small 2% reduction only. Partially,
this was because any significant reduction in Social Security benefits

was not viewed as politically expedient by Congress, but since OASDI
outlays are huge, even small percentage reductions like that translated
into billions of current dollars in reduced spending. However, the

averaged expenditures for the OASDI program still annually accounted

for close to $9 billion of the federal budget deficit during that same
6

period.

The only significant reduction in overall Social Security bene

fits was during the 1980-82 elimination of benefits for post-secondary
students, as the other legislated cut—elimination of the minimum bene

fit threshold—was rather quickly restored for pre-1982 beneficiaries
after a storm of political protest.

Table V-II shows the Congressional Budget Office's projected OASDI
and Hospital Insurance expenditures for 1983-88. Without substantial
changes in current law, these projections predict a significant short

fall between expenditures and revenues for the next 5 years. (See
Table IV-I for the assumptions these projections are based on.) The

system will need approximately $71 billion in additional revenues for
1983-88 just to stave off insolvency, and the National Commission esti-^

mated that the system needs $150-200 billion overall during that period.^
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CURRENT LAW PROJECTIONS OF SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST FUND
TABLE V-2:

OUTLAYS,INCOMES, AND BALANCES(In billions of dollars)
Actual
1982

1980

Estimated
1983

Baseline Projection
198^

1985

1986

1987

1988

201.8

216.1

172.7

Old Age and Survivors Insurance
TotalOutlays
Income a/
Year-End Balance
Start-of-Year
Balance as Percent

of Outlays

100.1
2^.6

137.9
126.6
12.5

26.8

17.3

103.2

152.7
1^6.5
6.3

8.2 ■

16^.^
138.3
-19.8

176.5
150.8
-^5.5

189.1
162.5
-72.1

-101.2

185.1
-132.1

3.9

-11.2

-24.1

-35.7

-46.8

Disability Insurance
Total Outlays
Income a/
Year-End Balance

18.7

17.A

18.0
21.U

7.7

6.8

19.0
7.0

36.6

18.8

36.0

15.3

19.1
26.8

32.7

19.4
37.4

20.0
41.0

20.8
45.0

14.8

28.3

46.3

67.2

91.4

37.0

77.0

146.0

231.2

323.9

236.8

19.2

Start-of-Year

Balance as Percent

of Outlays

Combined OAS! and DI

Total Outlays
Income a/
Year-End Balance
Start-of-Year
Balance as Percent

of Outlays

118.5

156.0

171.4

183.5

148.0

165.5

165.0

195.6
183.4

208.5
199.9

221.8

117.^

213.7

230.1

32.2

19.3

13.4

-5.1

-17.3

-25.8

-34.0

-40.7

28.1

17.5

11.3

7.3

-2.6

-8.3

-11.6

-14.3

288.3
272.9
-34.7

311.6
293.0

-6.7

-11.1

Combined OASI, DI, and Hospital Insurance
TotalOutlays
Income a/
Year-End Balance

209.3

245.3
232.0

4.7

-8.6

265.8
255.1
-19.4

10.2

1.9

-3.2

210.4
193.4
23.2

227.8

i^6.7

190.8
185.6
40.1

32.7

23.8

19.1

1^2.8
U2.8

-53.3

Start-of-Year

Balance as Percent

of Outlays

NOlE:

a.

Minus signs denote a deficit.

Income to the trust funds is budget authority. It includes payroll tax receipts, interest on
balances, and certain general fund transfers. Income in 1983 reflects interfund transfers as
authorized under the Social Security Amendments of 1981. In order to illustrate better the

operations of the trust funds under extended interfund or other types of borrowing or under
tax rate reallocation, estimated interest payments owed by a trust fund when it shows a

deficit are included as negative values in the income estimates of that trust fund.
SOURCE; Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options,

Congressional Budget Office (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government

Printers, 1983), p. 67. Hereafter cited as CBO, Deficit ^83.
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Strategles to.Solve the Financing Problems of Social Security

The National Cotiraiission on Social Security Reform's study and the

principal CBO study cited here had two different aims. The National Commission
study was intended to find a practical way of keeping the Social Security sy
stem solvent, and thus all of their recommendations focused on effecting finan

cial savings and raising revenue. The CBO study, on the other hand, was pri

marily aimed at exploring effective strategies to reduce Social Security's
impact on the federal budget deficit in the near future, and only secondarily
at discussing strategies to keep Social Security solvent. As such, the CBO

study focused on both across-the-board and targeted reduction strategies.

Although variations of several of the strategies were included in both

studies (e.g., shifting COLAs and increasing selected tax rates), the CBO
study had a greater emphasis on structural change options than did the
National Commission study. In fact, the latter specifically recommended that
neither the fundamental structure of the Social Security program nor its
8

fundamental principles be altered.

Below is a summary analysis of the Social Security strategies discussed

by both studies. The 0MB analysis included in the President's fiscal 1983
package of budget proposals, defers any action on Social Security to the
9

National Commission's recommendations.

Across-the—Board Options;

A.

Reducing the COLAs for Social Security

Reducing or eliminating COLAs has been an option bandied about for

several years. Such reduction was achieved for the 1983 fiscal year for

younger retirees, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, but it and all of
the other various COLA—reduction/elimination strategies depend heavily on
the rate of inflation to have much effect other than a negative one for
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elderly and disabled beneficiaries. Higher inflation rates when COLAreductions are legislated mean greater savings, thus the 1980-81 fiscal
10

years would have been better suited than the current year.

Reductions in COLAs would, theoretically., decrease the growth rate
of Social Security expenditures, but they would neither solve the short or

long-term solvency problem of the Social Security system nor necessarily
stabilize the trust funds of the system. In addition, such reductions

would increase the incidence of poverty among the elderly and disabled,
since the resultant loss of income would not usually be offset by signi

ficantly increased participation by Social Security beneficiaries in meanstested programs like SSI and Food Stamps.

According to the CBO analysis, the four major COLA-reduction/elimination
options for the 1980's are a permanent COLA delay, capping COLAs, elimi
nating the 1983 COLA, and eliminating both the 1983 and 1984 COLAs. For
1984-85, a cumulative estimated $10.4 billion would be saved by permanently

switching the annual timing of COLAs from July to October, $57.9 billion

from capping COLAs at the CPI level less 2 percentage points, $33.7
billion for repealing the 1983 COLA alone, and an estimated $67.1 billion
12

will be saved by eliminating both the 1983 and 1984 COLAs.

The National

Commission study recommended a permanent shift of the COLA payments to a

calender year rather than fiscal year basis.

This is another delayed
13

COLA strategy estimated to save $40 billion between 1983-89.

B.

Increasing Payroll Tax Rates

This strategy is already legislated for 5.7% (from 5.4%) in 1985 and
6.2% in 1990. The argument is for implementing these increases earlier
to affect the increase of short-term revenues without fundamentally
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altering the long-term tax rates. For example, according to the CBO,

implementing the January 1, 1985 rate increase on January 1, 1984 would

produce an estimated $6.4 billion of extra revenues in 1984, and $2.3 billion
in 1985; while moving the 1990 increase to 1984 would raise an estimated

$97.6 billion between 1984-1988.

14

The National Commission also recommended

that the 1985 and 1990 rates be revised. It estimated savings at $40

billion for such shifts between 1983-89.^^
The advantages include large receipt yields at the cost of relatively

small percentage increases for each worker, the lessened need for

benefit

reductions which a priori will have an adverse effect on beneficiaries, and
the maintenance, of the present method of financing Social Security.

The

disadvantages include increased tax burdens on workers, however modest

individually, which will add to 4 other payroll tax-rate hikes since 1977
to keep the system solvent, the real reduction in take-home pay that will
inevitably result, and the predicted adverse effect on the nation's economy

(i.e,, it is expected to raise labor costs, reduce employment and re-spark
16

inflationl,

C.

Changing the Benefit Formula

The basic formula for initial Social Security benefits utilizes three
calculated quantities associated with a worker's Average Indexed Monthly

Earnings (or AIME, which is an adjusted measure of average monthly earnings
covering the years of eligible employment).

90% of the first $254 of the

worker's AIME, plus 32% of the. next $1274 of AIME., plus 15% of all AIME in
exbess. of $1528 equals a person's basic benefit.

The argument for the rele

vant option is to adjust the first and last amounts (the percentage of

$254 and $1528) which, are called bend points.

There is already an automatic
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upward adjustment of them based on the increase in overall average earnings
of American workers, and, according to the CBO, the argument is to adjust

them by 75% rather than 100%.^^ In the short-run, there would be an esti
mated $1.2 billion in savings for 1984-88, an amount not seemingly worth
the effort unless accompanied by other changes. For the long-run, this

type of adjustment, theoretically, would have more of a substantial
,. 18

impact.

Associated with this type of option is a variant of the strategy em

ployed in the recent legislation for reducing COLAs for younger retirees.

It argues for a lengthening of the AIME formula computation period by
three years—to age 65, rather than 62. It would lower early retiree
benefit levels, and would lessen incentives for early retirement, but

disproportionately affect disabled recipients even more adversely. It
would save an estimated $1.6 billion in the short-run during 1984-88, and
19

again not be worth the short-term effect alone.
See Table V-3 for a summary of the CBO across-the-board options and
their cost effects, and Table V-4 for a summary of the National Commission
recommendations.

Targeted Reduction Options

20

A. According to the CBO, eliminating benefits for the children of early
retirees (ages 62-64) would produce an estimated $1.6 billion in cumulative

savings from 1984-88. Currently, the unmarried child of a retired worker

is categorically eligible for 50% of the amount of the retiree's basic^
benefit with certain restricted total amounts per family. Repealing that

would encourage later retirement and further reduce short-term outlays.

B, Tightejiing the family limit for OASI benefits by making it identical
to that for the more restrictive DI benefits for all new OASI beneficiaries
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TABLE. V-3; IMPACT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST FUNDS OF
ACROSS-THE-BOARD CHANGES a/ (In billions of dollars)
Cumulative
Five-Year

Options

1985

1984

1986

1987

1988 Savings

Short-Run COLA Reductions

Delay the COLA by
2.0

2.1

2.1

2.1

2.1

10.4

4.2

7.8

11.5

15.3

19.1

57.9

COLA

6.8

6.9

6.9

6.7

Eliminate the 1983
and 198^ COLAs

8.8

14.8

14.8

14.6

Three Months

Cap the COLA at the
CPI Increase Minus
2 Percentage

Points Through 1988
Eliminate the 1983

6.4 =33.7

14.1

67.1

Short-Run Payroll Tax Rate Increases
Move 1985 Rate to

danuary 198^
Move 1985 and 1990

Rates to January 1984

6.4

2.3

19.3

19.4

18.3

19.6

0

8.7

21.0

97'.6

Long-Run Changes
Restrict Increases in
Formula Bend Points

to 75 Percent of Wage
Increases

Lengthen Computation
Period by Three Years

a.

5/

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.6

1.2

b/

0.1

0.3

0.5

0.7

1.6

The impact of these options on the federal budget deficit may be

somewhat smaller than the trust fund effects shown here, due to

offsetting increases in spending for other federal programs or
reductions in federal tax receipts. For the options that would reduce

spending, only the effects on outlays are shown in this table, because
changes in budget authority (which includes interest) are uncertain
when trust fund balances are negative and declining.
b.

Less than $50 million.

SOURCE: CBO, Deficit '83, p. 72.
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TABLE 7-4: SUMMARY OF THE. NATIONAL COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS—

SHORT-RANGE AND LONG-RANGE COST ANALYSIS OF OASDI PROPOSALS

Savings,

Long-Range
Savings

1983-89

(percentage

Short-Term

Proposal

Cover nonprofit and new Federal employees-S./

(billions)

of ^payroll)

+$20

+.30%

Prohibit withdrawal of State and local

govemnient employees
Taxation of benefits for higher-income persons
Shift COLAs to calendar-year basis
Eliminate windfall benefits for persons with

pensions from noncovered employment

+3

—

+30

+.60

+40

+.27

+.2

+.01

Continue' benefits on remarriage for disabled

widow(er)s and for divorced widow(er)s
Index deferred widow(er)'s benefits based on

-.1

wages (instead of CPI)
Permit divorced aged spouse to receive benefits
when husband is eligible to receive benefits
Increase benefit rate for disabled widow(er)s
aged 50-59 to 71^% of primary benefit

-.2

-.05

-.1

-.01

-1

-.01

Revise tax-rate schedule

+40

+.02

Revise tax basis for self-employed

+18

+.19

—

Reallocate OASDI tax rate between OASI and DI
Allow inter-fund borrowing from HI by OASDI
Credit the OASDI Trust Funds, by a lump-sum

payment for cost of gratuitous military service
wage credits and past unnegotiated checks

+18

—

Base automatic benefit increases on lower of CPI

or wage increases after 1987 if fund ratio is
under 20%, with catch-up if fund ratio
exceeds 32%

Increase delayed retirement credit from 3% per
year to 8%, beginning in 1990 and reaching

-.10^/

8% in 2010

Additional long-range changesTotal Effect

a/
~^

—

+168

+.58
+1.80

This cost estimate assumes that retirement patterns would be only slightly
affected by this change. If this change does result in significant changes
in retirement behavior over time, the cost increase would be less (or possibly
even a small savings could result).

b/

Alternate methods for obtaining this long-range savings are presented in the
Additional Statements of the members (in Chapter 4).

c/

Includes effect of revised tax schedule.

SOURCE; THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION, op. citl p. 2-5. In April, 1983,

all of the above recommendations were enacted into law with President Reagan^s
signing of the Social Security Reform Act. See Chapter VI for a discussion.
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would save an estimated $2,1 hillion dollars over 1984-1988.^^ It would
regressively affect lower benefit families, more adversely than higher bene
fit beneficiaries, but also bring benefits and earnings more in line with
each. Other.

C. Increasing the waiting period for DI benefits from five to six months
which returns the regulation to pre—1972, would save an estimated $1 billion

dollars during 1984-88. This too would be regressive, adversely affecting
the low-income disabled more, but administratively bring DI eligibility
into line with other Social Security and private disability plans.

D.

Taxing 50% of Social Security benefits for families with incomes

exceeding $12,000 (single parent), or $18,000 (couples) would he similar
22

to the current state of UI benefit taxation.

It would raise an esti

mated $29,7 billion over 1984-88 and could be targeted directly into the
trust funds.

above.

This is a far more progressive option than either B or C

It would reduce the disparities between Social Security benefits

and other pensions and in effect,, be similar to/'an income-targeted benefit
23

cut."

It would also reduce or eliminate an incentive for early retire

ment since the current exemption for S,S, benefits increases their value

relative to earnings, and it would help lessen the* present disparity be

tween earnings/contributions and benefits (.usually well in excess of the
former).

E. Extending Social Security coverage to the 10% of job categories not
now participating would increase trust fund income. Present arguments are

to include federal civilian employees, state and local government employees,

and employees of nonprofit organizations. Although. 90% of all job cate

gories in America are now covered by Social Security, 90% of federal
civilian employees are not covered, 30% of state/local government employees
.
■
24
are not now covered and 20% of the. nonprofit employees.
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The CBO study indicates that adding all new federal civilian workers
and those with less than five years of employment into the Social Security

system would produce an estimated $12.6 billion dollars over the 1984-88
period. This can be added to the $6.7 billion estimated from requiring
the participation of non-profit employees, which is presently on a volun

tary basis. The National Commission estimates the savings to be $20 billion
for the 1983-89 period for adding both new federal employees and non-profit
workers into the Social Security system. Such a strategy would presumably
offer federal workers better disability and survivor protection than the

Civil Service Retirement system provides, and reduce the present inequity

of many federal workers benefiting from Social Security without signifi
cantly contributing earnings to it. However, one great obstacle to this
option is the necessity of fundamentally changing the CSR system to
25

implement it. For the non-profit employee participation, another major,

disadvantage would be possible labor cost

increases and probable employee

reductions.

Adding state/local government employees would raise an estimated
$1.9 billion in revenues from 1984-88, according to the CBO. The National
Commission recommended

that prohibiting the withdrawal of present local

and state employees on Social Security, and adding new ones, would raise
26

an estimated $3 billion.

As with federal workers the disability and

survivors benefits are thought to be better, and, unlike most other pension

plans. Social Security is transferable from job to job. There will be
constitutional problems, however, in the federal government seeking to
collect the employers^ share of payroll taxes from state and local

governments. In addition, there may be greater state/local costs
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involved in the new arrangements, and in this day of fiscal crisis, they
27

will be very reluctant to agree to participate.

See Table V-5 for a summary of all of these options based on the CBO

study, and V-6 for another view of the National Commission's recommended
strategies.

II.

Medicare and Medieaid

These two entitlement programs face continued pressure for undisciplined

expenditure growth for the rest of the 1980's principally because of the un
controlled growth in medical care costs, with the increase in the low-income,
elderly and disabled population only accounting for about 2% of that pro

blem.

See Table V-7 for the CBO projections of federal outlays for. Medicare

and Medicaid.

As already mentioned earlier in this thesis, the fiscal 1982

and 1983 expenditures would have been even higher except for the 1981 Recon

ciliation Act's cuts, particularly in federal payments for Medicaid.

Medi

care costs were around 1% lower than what they would have been, and Medicaid

5%.

The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, 1982, (TEFRA) made addi

tional reductions, particularly in Medicare coverage, with savings estimated
at $11.3 billion (5.4% of projected outlays) in Medicare expenditures dur
ing 1983-85, and $1 billion (1.5%) in Medicaid.

28

These reductions were

all either from changes in hospital reimbursements, or from other modifica

tions in federal and state benefit and payment policies - in effect, non
structural program changes.

Such will not bring Medicare and Medicaid
29

entitlement spending under control.
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TABLE V-5:

IMPACT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY TRUST FUNDS
OF TARGETED STRATEGIES TO REDUCE SOCIAL

SECURITY BENEFITS a/(In billions of dollars)

Cumulative

Five-Year

Options

198^

1985

1986

1987

1988

Savings

Eliminate Benefits

for Children of Early
Retirees

•

b/

0.2

0.3

0.5

0.6

1.6

0.1

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

2.1

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

1.0

Tighten the Limit on
Family Benefits for
OASI Beneficiaries

Increase the Waiting
Period for DI Benefits
to Six Months

a.

The impact of- these options on the federal budget deficit may be
somewhat smaller than the trust fund effects shown here, due to

offsetting increases in spending for other federal programs or
reductions in federal tax receipts. For the options that would reduce
spending, only the effects on outlays are shown in this table, because

changes in budget authority (which includes interest) are uncertain
when trust fund balances are negative and declining.
b.

Less than $50 million.

Benefits for post-secondary school students between the ages of 18
and 22 are currently being phased out.

SOURCE: CBO, Deficit, 83, pp, 77, 80., 83,

(continued)
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TABIE Vr-S
(continued)

REVENUE GAINS FROM TARGETED STRATEGIES TO
INCREASE SOCIAL SECURITY i AXES (In billions
of dollars)
^

^

^

—

/

Cumulative
Five-Year

Options

198^^

1985

1986

1987

1988 Increase

Tax 50 Percent of OASDI
Benefits for Families with
Total Incomes Above

$12,000 (Individuals)/
$18,000 (Couples)
Trust fund revenues

1.7

5.8

6.6

7A

8.2

29.7

Unified budget revenues

1.7

5.8

6.6

7.^

8.2

29.7

Trust fund revenues

0.9

2.7

2.9

3.1

3.3

12.9

Unified budget revenues

0.^

1.3

1.^

1.5

1.6

6.2

Increase Self-Employed Tax
Rate to Combined EmployerEmployee Rate and Allow
50 Percent of Payroll
Tax to Be Deductible

-82

TABLE V-5

(continued)

REVENUE GAINS FROM EXTENDING SOCIAL
SECURITY COVERAGE(In billions of dollars)
Cumulative
Five-Year

Options

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988 Increase

Cover Federal Civilian
Workers with Fewer Than
Five Years of Service
Trust fund revenues

I.I

1.9

2.6

3.2

3.8

12.6

Unified budget
revenues a/

0.6

1.0

1.3

1.6

1.9

6.4

Trust fund revenues

O.I

0.2

0.4

0.5

0.7

1.9

Unified budget revenues

0.1

0.2

0.4

0.5

0.7

1.9

Trust fund revenues

0.9

1.3

1.6

1.8

2.1

6.7

Unified budgeFrevenues

0.9

1.3

1.6

1.8

2.1

6.7

Cover New State and
Local Government

Employees

Cover All Employees of

Nonprofit Organizations

a.

Estimate Is^as'ed on the assumption that the

®

would bemnaffected, so new federal employees would pay both Social
Security taxes and GSR contributions. Alternatively, " the

supplementary pension plan paralleled most private plans by requiring
no employee contribution, reductions in the federal deficit would be
much smaller and would primarily consist of employers-share paymerits from the Postal Service.
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TABLE V-6:

ESTIMATED IMPACT OF THE NATION. L v:CM\riSSION'5 PROPOSALS
ON OASDl TRUST FUNDS Un Diilions of

Total
1983

198^

1983

1986

1987

1988

1983-1933

Trust Fund Outlay Reductions

Delay COLA from July .
to January

1.7

3.8

^.2

^.3

^.7

3.2

2^1. 1

0

-0. 1

-0.2

-0.3

-0.3

-O.L

-1.3

1.7

3.7

^.0

^.3

^.8

22.8

22.

Miscellaneous

Benefit Provisions a/

Total Outlay Reduciions

Trust Fund Income Increas^
Tax 30 Percent of

1.2

^.2

^.9

3.6

6.^

6.^

2.3

0

0

10.3

19.0

Tax Rate

1.0

3.0

2.9

3.1

3.3

13.6

Extend Coverage c/

1.0

1.9

2.3

3.2

^.3

12.9

-0.^ ' 'OA

-0.1

-0. 1

18.6

OASDI Benefits b/

Increase Payroll
Tax Rate

Increase Self-Employed

Credit Trust Funds for

Military Wage Credits
and Reimbursement for

Uncashed Benefit
Checks
Total Income Increases

19.9

-0.3

19.9

9.^

11.1

9.9

11.8

2^.3

86.6

21.6

13.1

13.1

1^.3

16.2

29.3

109.6

0.3

2.9

3.8

6.8

8.3

28.3

21.9

16.0

20.0

23.0

37.6

Total Reductions in

Outlays and Increases
in Income

Estimated Increase in
Interest Income

Total Increase in
OASDI Trust Funds

NOTE:

1^.3

138.!

Preliminary CBO estimates. Components may not add to totals due to rounding.
Negative numbers indicate outlay increases or revenue reductions.

a.

Provisions include increasing benefits for certain groups of widowed and divorced
persons, and decreasing benefits to persons with pensions from employment not
covered by Social Security.

b.

Estimate assumes that taxes on OASDI benefits would be phased in the same way as
are taxes on Unemployment Insurance benefits.

c.

Estimate

includes effect of

prohibiting

governments from Social Security.

SOURCE: CBO, Deficit, '83, p. 88.

the

withdrawal of state and

local
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TABLEy-.7: federal OUTLAYS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAIO
(In billions of dollars)

Actual

Estimated

Baseline Proiection

Major Program

19S0

19S2

19S3

19SL

19S5

19S6

19S7

i9'iS

50.^

57. I

65 A

7^.0

98.7

112. 1

35.0

85.2

Medicare

3^.9

38.9

^^0 3

^9.7

57.3

'66 A

7^.7

2^,3

15.6

18.2

21.1

2^.5

27.9

32T3- "

37.3

10.7

17.^

19.^

21.3

2^.1

26.2

28.7

31

l^.O

Hospital Insurance
Supplementary
Medical Insurance
Medicaid

SOURCE: CBO, Deficit, 83, p, 9.8,
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Current Options

There are two principal categories of current strategy for hetter con

trolling Medicare/Medicald costs: a continuation of the progrannnatlc
approach (I.e., cosmetic changes In benefit regulations and reimbursement

policies), and a structural approacb to enact legislation, "aimed at the
30

medical care system as a whole,"

, ^

.

The programmatic options Include In

creased beneficiary cost sharing, prospective hospital reimbursement and
31

changes In physician reimbursement.

See Table y-^8 for the CBl) cost projecr..

tlons associated with tbese options.

The structural approacb Is thus far concentrated on encouraging market
place competition In the medical care field, and Increased government regu
lation of medical care.

Currently there Is little of either, and under

the present administration more government regulation of such a vast Industry
as medical care Is highly Improbable, At least one federal resource capable of

initiating such competition is the current tax subsidy for employer-paid
health Insurance for employees.

Currently employers get a tax break by con

verting some employee compensation to health Insurance as opposed to employee

cash payments. Repeal of this tax subsidy would fuel an Increased utiliza
tion of employer—employee cost sharing plans and market searchas for cost
containment plans. In addition, there Is an Increasing advocacy for greater

usage of Health Maintenance Organizations as health care providers, and
Instituting larger beneficiary deductlbles and more use of coinsurance
arrangements to spur marketplace competition.

Regulation would, for the most part. Involve more government control
of payments to health care delivery systems and a standardization, of types
and costs of patient services.

An example of such

standardization woiild be
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TABLE

BUDGET SAVINGS FROM PROGRAM CHANGES IN
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID (In millions of dollars)
Cum u!a ti ve
Five-Year

Options

198^

1985

Days 2-30 a/ •
Budget Authority -190
Outlays
1,980

-520

3,010

1988

Savin-^s

-800

-1,070 --1,370

-3,950

3,900

3,820 " 9,290

16,990

1986

1987

Medicare

Increase Beneficiary

Cost-Sharing

Expand Hospital
Coinsurance

Expand Hospital
Coinsurance

with Cap on
Out-of-Pocket

Costs for Some a/
-70

-290

-900

-550

-720

1,190

1,820

2,050

2,320

2,610

-1,980
9,990

Budget Authority

900

Outlays

1,120
1, 120

1,700
1,700

2,960

900

3,370
3,370

9,550
9,550

Budget Authority
Outlays
Increase SMI

Premiums a/

2,960*

Increase SMI
Premiums for

High-Income
Families Only

Budget Authority

2i;0

300

950

650

Outlays

290

300

950.

650

890
890

2,530
2,530

2,390

3,610

9,820

5,970

20,950

Tax the Premiums

for Supplemental

Coverage b/

9,160

SOURCE: CBO, Deficit,83, pp. 104-105.

(continued)
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TABLE V-8 (continued)

Cumulative
Five-Year

Options

198^

1985

1986

1987

1988

Savings

-—

--

-80
2,1^0

-300
^,100

-580
^,610

-960
10,850

^0
10

260
190

670
590

1,200
1,100

1,830
1,730

^,000
3,620

170
ISO

700
680

810
790

9^0
920

1,100
1,070

3,720
3,6^0

---

870
S70

660
660 .

8^0
8^0

1 ,0^0
1 ,0^0

3,^10
3,^10

Move to Prospective
Hospital
Reimbursement

Replace Reimburse
ment Limits in
TEFRA with

Prospective
Reimbursement

Budget Authority
Outlays
Change Physician
Reimbursement

Limit Reasonable

Charge Growth
Budget Authority
Outlays
Adopt Fee Schedules
for Surgical
Procedures

Budget Authority
Outlays
Medicaid
Extend Cuts in

Matching Grants
for Medicaid

Budget Authority
Outlays
a.

Savings estimates reflect the concurrent increase in federal Medicaid
expenditures.

b.
„

Savings are a combination of outlay reductions and revenue increases.
B..u.dget authority estimates are not available.

--The Social Security Reform Act, 1983, contained an enactment of some
provisions which call for a fundamental change in the reimbursement
procedures for beneficiary care and cost containment. See Chapter
VI for a further discussion.
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mandating a prospective rather than retrospecttye reimbursement policy for
all providers of medical care payments. Such, would force hospitals to
attempt to limit their currently unrestrained expansion in costs. This
strategy is already being demonstrated in 7 states which have instituted

hospital cost control policies. Their combined growth in 1976-81 in-patient
expenses is 11%/year as compared to 14% in states without hospital cost

control programs.

Regulation could also entail a standardization of phy

sicians- fees and the establishment of federal health care planning guide

lines..

The former is already being successfully done in other countries.

More of this type of structural solution should be actively pursued to
contain entitlement spending in the medical field.
III. Other Entitlement Programs

The heavyweights of "uncontrollability" in entitlements are Social Security,
Medicare/Medicaid and currently, unemployment compensation. All three require

heavy outlay commitments from the budget even without indexation, just be
cause of the nature of their program goals and scope. Excluding the agri

cultural entitlements, and interest on the public debt, the rest of the en

titlement programs have undisciplined increases only insofar as indexation,

program interaction, and numbers of beneficiaries affect the steady growth
of their funding needs and their combined, overall numbers. Individually,

these programs do not require huge federal outlay commitments. In spite of
that, these programs, most especially the means^tested individual assistance

categories, sustained the bulk of the highly publicized 1981 Reconciliation
Act budget cuts. Reductions ranging from 10-20% of CBO estimated outlays

were implemented in all of the means-tested programs other than SSI and
Veterans' Pensions, and in the Guaranteed Student Loan program, child
.

33

nutrition, UI, Trade Adjustment Assistance and Title XX Social Services,
as mentioned earlier in this thesis. Additionally, the 0MB continued to

view the problem of control of entitlements as correctable through annual
reductions in benefits from most of the same programs, especially the means
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tested entitlements. Thus, most of its fiscal 1983 and 1984 proposals to
34

reduce federal entitlement spending were aimed at^ these programs.
This section discusses the current options to either generate more revenue

for the above mentioned"other" entitlement programs or to reduce their outlays,
As the Tables V-9 and V-10 show, there is little projected growth in

these programs during the rest of the 1980's, assuming unemployment and

inflation significantly decline.

Such projections do not depend on any of

the options to be discussed here, but instead provide projections demon

strating there is a pattern of expenditure stability already being developed,
■

■

■

and suggests that at least some of the 1981 cuts were definite overkill.
The options discussed in this section - some structural, some cosmetic - can
significantly aid the accuracy of the projections in the tables.

They, in

addition, further demonstrate that Congress can definitely control some en

titlements, particularly with structural changes.

However, the essence of

Congress' problems with entitlement uncontrollables has never been with
most of the entitlements discussed in this section, but with the entitle

ment heavyweights.

Only through structural strategies can that essential

problem be effectively dealt with.

Current Options

There are five major options presently being considered to control effec^
tively the entitlements relevant to this section: modifying and adjusting

federal pension structures, providing additional trust fund revenues taxing
certain program benefits, more efficiently targeting program aid to those
most in need of it, and resolving program redundancies.

A. Restructuring military retirement benefits has become a rather consis

tent argument recently. These benefits cost $15 million in 1982, and pre

sently this system offers substantial cash payments for those retirees with
20 or more years of service, but virtually no benefits for nondisabled

■
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TABXE V-g:

FEDERAL OUTLAYS FOR "OTHER ENTITLE.StENT" PROGRAMS
(In billions of dollars)

Actual

Major Program

19S0

Estimated

Easeiine Projection

1982

1983

198^

1985

1986

1987

1988

16.9

29.3

33.0

27.8

26.5

26.1

25.9

23.6

Benefits for Individuals

Non-Means-Tested Programs
Unemployment
Insurance

Trade Adjustment
1 .7

0.1

0.1

0.1

a/

a/

a/

a/

"Veterans' Compensation
^ Black Lung

7.9

9.3

9.9

10.2

10.6

10.9

11.2

11 .3

1 .8

2.0

1.8

9.7

3.3

1.8
3.7

1.8

Railroad Retirement b/

3.9

6.0

1.8
6.2

6.3

1 .8
6.9 '

Assistance

1.8

:

Means-Tested Programs
AFDC c/
SSI d/

7.3

8.0

8.1

8.9

8.3

8\S

9.1

9.3

6.9

7.7

8.6

7.9

8.1

8.9

8.6

9.6

Veterans' Pensions

3.6

3.9

3.8

3.7

-3.7

3.6

3.3

3.3

Food Stamps e/

9.1

11.0

12.9

12.2

1273

13.1

13.3

13.8

Partially Means-Tested
Programs
Guaranteed Student
Loans

I

Child Nutrition

3.0

^.7

2..5

2.6

2.9

2.8

2.6

2.3

^.6

^.9

3.2

5A

3.7

6.0

Public Service Grants for
States and Localities
General Revenue

Sharing

6.9

9.6

9.6,

9.7

3.0

3.2

3.3

3.7

2.8

2.6

2.3

2.3

2.6

2.7

2.7

2.7

73.3

87.9

97.6

92.2

93.9

93.0

96.9

Title XX Social
Services
Total

a.

Less than $30 million.

b.

About 60 percent of outlays for Railroad Retirement provide Social Security benefits for
retired railroad workers.

c.

AFDC estimates include the Child Support Enforcement program.

d.

Fiscal years 1983 and 1988 include 13 months of benefits; fiscal year 1989 includes
months.

e.

Estimates include nutrition assistance for Puerto Rico.

f.

These programs, while partially means-tested, do serve some higher-income households.

SOURCE: CBO, Deficit, ^83, p. 118.

^
;
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TARTF XZ-tO' budgetary OUTLAYS AND RECEIPTS FOR FEDERAL
CIVILIAN COMPENSATION (In billions of dollars)

Actual

Major Program

1980

1982

Baseline Projection

Estimated

1983

198^

1983

1986

1987

1988

Gross Outlays
Pay

31.0

33.2

36.1

39.0

61.9

6^.9

68.1

19.3

21.2

22.8

2^.4

26.^

28.3

30.2

Civil Service

Retirement

1^.7

Other
Benefits

Total

^.9

6.6

8.3

10. ]

12.]

1^.3

17.0

20.2

614.0

77.1

82.7

89.0

93.3

102.6

110.2

118.3

7.7

8.0

Receipts and Collections
Civil Service
Retirement

3.2

3.8

6.0

6.2

7.0

7.3

3.^
11.6

6.t4
13.^

7.6

9.0

10.7

13.1

16.7

18.7

87.3

93.3

99.

Other

Benefits

Total Offsets

2.14

3.6

i4.t4

7.6

9.(4

10.^

Net Budget Impvact
Total

36.i

67.7

72.3

77.i4

82. 1

a. Includes group health plans, life insurance, and workers' compensation.

b. Includes-contributions from federal employees and off-budget agencies, which represent
federal revenues and offsetting receipts, respectively.

SOURCE: Ibid, p. 187.
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retirees with less than the 20 years.

35

The one-half COLA adjustment for younger retirees through 1985, pre
viously mentioned, was one general response to this argument.

Other

options would include: (a) making that half-COLA adjustment permanent, (b)
providing a single catch-up annuity adjustment for military retirees once

they reach 62 to partially compensate for any inequities caused by this

permanent change, (c) providing some selected benefits for 62-year-old
retirees with at least 10 years of service, and (d) basing retirement
36

benefits on a retirees' three highest pay years.

Combined, these other

options would save an estimated $1.9 billion between 1984-88.

Advantages

of these combined effects would include improving military personnel manage

ment efficiency, increasing the retention of non-senior career staff, and
discouraging early retirement while achieving the above savings.

Disadvan

tages include a substantial risk of damaging the morale of active duty
personnel and motivating a compensatory increase in reenlistment bonuses
and other special outlays.

37

For reducing retirement costs for federal civilian personnel there are

three major strategies currently under consideration: modification of Civil
Service Retirement benefits for all new retirees, instituting fixed-rate

individual retirement plans for all new employees, and rescinding the over
38

compensation for pre-1977 retirees.

Benefits can be modified by gradually reducing the earned amount for

pre-65 retirees no matter what their length of service.

Currently retirees

are eligible for full benefits at 55 with 30 years of service, or at 60,
with 20 years.

Another such reduction device is the gradual institutioni

zation of calculating a retiree's benefit levels from averaging his 5

-93

highest earnings years rather than his 3 highest years as is presently

done.

Benefits can also be modified by changing the formula for survivor's

benefits to incorporate retiree age variations, and by limiting COLAs for
both new and current beneficiaries to 33% of the CPI for retirees young

er than 62, and 70% for those 62 and older.

Together these options can

account for an estimated $1.7 billion in budget authority savings be
39

tween 1984-88, and nearly $6 billion in outlays (see Table V-11).

Using a fixed-rate plan would solve one of the vexing dilemmas of
pension plans — the costs of the pensions usually far exceeding the
combined employer/employee contributions to them.

Currently the

difference is paid through government appropriations.
rate plan, agency contributions

Under a fixed-

would be raised to a specified level

and separated from employee contributions into interest-bearing accounts

(e.g. U.S. Treasury Securities) applicable to new employees only.

The full government appropriations contribution would then be restricted
to employees with a minimtim time of participation in the fixed-rate

system (e.g., 5 years, 10 years, etc.). Besides the balancing of contri
butions to benefits, fixed-rate plans encourage the decline of short

term and before-age-62 employees from withdrawing their benefits/
contributions on the one hand, as opposed to accepting a deferred

annuity beginning at age 62, thus increasing the number and percentage
of retirees to receive government annuities.

On the other hand is the

reduction of both the costs of government contributions as a percent of

employee payrolls and the actual benefits accruing to career employees.
Concerning pension overcompensation for pre-1977 retirees, between

1970-1976, the COLAs for the CSR system were legislated to include 101%
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TABLE V-11:

BUDGET SAVINGS FROM STRATEGIES TO
REDUCE PAY AND PENSIONS FOR FEDERAL

CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES (In billions of dollars)

Cumulative
Five-Year

Options

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

Savings

Freeze 1984 Pay and
Pension Adjustments

Budget Authority

2.6

3.4

3.6

3.6

3.8

17.1

Outlays

2.9

4.0

4.2

4.4

4.6

20.0

-0.2

0.2
0.6

0.4
1.2

0.5
1.7

0.7
2.3

1.7
5.9

-0.1

-0.3
0-1

-0.5
*9.2

-0.7
0.3

-0.9
0.3

-2.5
0.9

—

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

1.0

0.1

0.2

0.5

0.8

1.0

2.6

Modify CSR Benefits

Budget Authority
Outlays
Revamp CSR"System

Budget Authority
Outlays
Adjust Certain CSR
Annuities for Past

Overcompensation

Budget Authority
Outlavs
NOTE:

Totals may not add because of rounding.

SOURCE: CBO, Deficit, '83, p.. 191.,
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of the changes in the CPI. Effective 1977, that additional 1% adjustment
was rescinded but not retroactively.

The strategy for correcting this

and associated imbalances(short of a direct retroactive rescission) calls

for a temporary reduction of such COLAs to \ the changes in the CPI until
the affected benefits are in line with current retirement provisions.
41

The estimated savings by 1988 will be $1 billion.
B.

Additional trust fund revenues can be generated by expanding the

tax base

of trust fund programs, especially U.I.

This social insur

ance program has recently been teetering on insolvency due to the com
bined impacts of the 1973-75, 1980, and present recessions.

To

counter this trend, the current $7,000 unemployment payroll tax base

per employee could be tied to increases in the national average wages
earned similar to the present practice employed with the tax base for

Social Security. This would be opposed to the current practice of

allowing U.I. benefits to rise based on a beneficiary's prior earnings
and other adjustments, while the U.I. tax base remains moribund and
42

out of synct.

This strategy could generate an estimated $900 million

in increased revenues in 1984 alone, and $15 billion between 1984—88,

generally cause revenues to increase as benefits do, and aid in the

long term solvency and stability of the system. A major disadvantage
could be the added increase in unemplojmient resultant from the expanded
costs of labor associated with increasing the payroll tax base.

C.

A3

A supplementary revenue-generating source is applying a tax to

selected program benefits. This was mentioned previously for Social

Security benefits and is currently under consideration for U.I. benefits,
Railroad Retirement, Veterans' and Workers' Compensations benefits via
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federal income taxes.

The revenues raised can then be earmarked for

the specific trust funds whose programs were responsible for the in
creased individual income leading to the federal tax.

Taxing benefits would mainly be applicable to the social insurance

programs, not the means-tested programs. U.I. benefits, for example,
as previously mentioned, are already included in taxable income above
$12,000 for individuals and $18,000 for couples. The currently pro
posed strategy argues for taxing all U.I. benefits in order to more com

prehensively include incomes marginal to these thresholds. It is
estimated that $6.6 billion in additional revenues in the years 1984-88,

would result from this procedure, in spite of criticisms that this would
44

increase the tax liabilities of moderate and low-income beneficiaries.

Taxing 40% of Railroad Retirement benefits is aimed at decreasing
the federal contribution to the program and resolving some of the contrasts

between these benefits and private pension programs.

Currently the

R.R.S. receives worker contributions from over 400,000 employees and
services over 1 million beneficiaries.

Though technically a private

pension fund, the R.R.S. iS administered by the federal government, has
some of its coverage overlapped with. Social Security, and its benefits
are tax free.

The current strategy

argues for taxing that portion

of R.R.S. benefits which exceed the worker contributions and that are

not substitutes for Social Security Income.

Revenue generation from

this strategy is estimated at $500 million in 1984 alone and $3.6 billion
in 1984-88, and achieving these amounts would not regressively harm
45

lower income beneficiaries.

•
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Veterans' Compensation benefits are also not now taxed.

They are

paid regatdless of income, from other sources to veterans eligible for
service—related disabilities and range from $62/month, for a 10% dis

ability to $1213/ month, for complete disability, plus other adjustments.
Taxing such benefits would be aimed at those veterans most able to

afford the added tax liability and would theoretically raise $1.1 billion
in 19.84, and $8.4 billiojj during 1984-88.

Taxing Workers' Compensation benefits is aimed at the income loss

payments, not the medical expenses category of this program. About
70% of workers' compensation payments are such income loss supplements

whose amounts vary state-to-state. Advantages include eliminating the
differences between the incomes of beneficiaries, and, the wages earned

and taxed by a 'healthy' worker, and reducing the disincentive of dis
abled workers receiving income supplements to teturn to work as quickly

as. they are able. Disadvantages include increased hardship in states/
regions with lower disability rates and the discrepancy that would be
established between tax-free court ordered disability compensation and

taxejd federal disability. It would raise an estimated $13,5 billion
47

during 1984-88.

D, Better targeting of aid to the neediest beneficiaries is a method
of achieving outlay-savings rather than raising revenue. It was proven
effective with the 19.81 Reconciliation Act's impact on the majority of

the means-tested programs, and is currently being considered for other
entitlements such as the Guaranteed Student Loans, Child Nutrition,
General Revenue Sharing and Veterans

Compensation programs.
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The major targeting strategy for the G.S.L. is the elimination of
the federal in-school interest subsidy allowed students in the professions.

Such students would be required to pay their own loan interests since

their future high-income employment is more readily assumed.

This

would not save much — only $500 million during 1984—88, — and may
make the G.S.L. arrangements too complicated for many lenders to con
tinue participation in the program.

For Child Nutrition, the strategy is to eliminate the federal re

imbursement for meals provided to non-poor children, particularly those
49

from families with incomes at or above 185% of the poverty line.

An

added advantage of this strategy, if it is one, is that a number of schools
would drop the Child Nutrition program as a direct result of this strategy:
some because it would decrease significantly the number of their enrollees

participating in the program, and others because required reporting re

gulations would become too onerous. The estimated savings would be $270
50

million for 1984, and $1.5 billion cumulative for 1984-88.

General revenue sharing, which currently provides unrestricted
51

federal grants to counties, cities, and townships,

could be further

limited to only local governments which demonstrate high fiscal stress

with low fiscal capacity. The argument for this strategy is aimed at
structurally eliminating the categorical entitlement of local governments

viz-a-viz general revenue sharing, even though any added reduction in
federal grants to local governments at this time, well-off or not, may

severely cripple these government efforts to provide citizen services.

The expected estimated savings if this option is enacted would be $1.1.
52

billion in 1984, and $7.6 billion during 1984-88.

-99

Thfi strategy optton concerning Veterans' Compensation is to repeal

legislation allowing cash, payments to certain veterans with 30%
or less disability, and retaining their health^medical benefits
allowance.

Additionally, there is an argument to eliminate the

allowances for dependents of veterans with, less than 50% disability.

For the first strategy, expected savings are $1.8 billion in 1984,
and $10.7 billion during 19-84-88.

For the accompanying strategy,

there would be an estimated 19.84 savings of $135 million.

The major

advantage of th.ese two options, besides the. money, are supposedly that

they would induce vate.rans who can work, to seek, it, further reducing
.

53

the federal government's financial res.ponsibli.ty,

E, The final major option is to eliminate or reduce federal program
redundancies and inconsistencies. One

corollary of this option is the

termination of the Trade Adjustment Assistance program entirely, and
it is contained in the current budget proposals for fiscal 1984.

It would save only an estimated $5Q million dollars for 1984.

Another

corollary would be the reduction of special allowances to G.S.L, lenders,
aimed at gradually reducing the lenders' yields to comparability with
Other market rates. It would save an estimated $3Q0 million during 1984
88. A third corollary would be COLA, delays for SSI and veterans

programs, similar to the COLA delays for Social Security. They would save
an estimated $80.0 millioih in 1984.
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IV. The Farm Support Options

Federal outlays for the farm price support system was $11.6 billion

in 1982, three times higher than in 1981. For 1983, outlays are esti
mated at nearly $18 billion, and projected to average over $6 billion
56

through 1984-88 (see Table V-12).

International economic conditions,

which are Out of this country's capacity to control, have a great deal
to do with those numbers. The government provides eligible farmers

price support loans, purchases and direct cash pa3niients to compensate

for low farm prices mainly resultant from large crop yields, a weak
world economy , and declining domestic consumption of milk products.
The current strategies to reduce government expenditures for these pro

grams were previously discussed in terms of the 1982 Reconciliation Act.
In this section, the additional strategy options for further reducing

government costs and restricting crop production for the future are
reported.

The two major federal support reduction strategies are eliminating

deficiency payments and capping the farmer-owned reserve level. Both

options would save money but at the expense of significantly reducing
the income for the farmers the programs are supposed to protect. De

ficiency payments, for example, are government support payments for
high export-crops — wheat, feed grains, upland cotton and rice. Be
tweeen 1974-80, approximately 2.5 billion in such payments were made,

$1.2 billion in 1981, and approximately $1.5 billion will be paid in

1982-83.^^ Eliminating them would save an estimated.$5.5 billion be
tween 1984-85. It is hoped that the few small farmers who benefit from

-101

FEDERAL OUTLAYS FOR AGRICULTURAL PRICE

SUPPORT PROGRAMS (In billions of dollars)

Actual

Baseline Projection

Estimated

Major Program

1980

1982

1983

198^

1985

1986

1987

1988

Wheat

0.9

2.2

^.1

2.0

1.^

0.7

0.8

0.5

Feed Grains

1.3

6A

6.1

3.1

2.6

1.5

1.3

1.1

-0.1

0.2

0.6

0.^

0.3

0.3

0.1

1.2

1.3

1.^

1.1

0.2

-0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

Rice

Upland Cotton
Tobacco
Peanuts

All Other
Total

NOTE:

a.

0.6

1.0

2.2

-0.^

0.3

2.7

11.6

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.9

1.6

1.7

1.6

1.5

1.5

9.0

7.^

k.5

1^.7

^.9

0.9

17.6

0.5

ay

i/

i/

Dairy

0,k

Commodity program outlays shown in the above table are CBO baseline outlays. They
are rounded to the nearest $100 million. A minus sign indicates a net receipt. This
baseline does not reflect the implementation of the payments-in-kind program but does
assume acreage control programs in effect during fiscal years 198^-1988 and assess
ments on milk marketings in fiscal years 1983-1987.*

Indicates outlays less than $50 million.

SOURCE: CBO, Deficit, '83, p. 135.
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these payments will be cushioned by offsetting payments from other
commodity programs, but that is not at all certain. Fortunately, the
bulk of these deficiency payments are made to large farmers and agri
business producers, and thus they could probably survive the elimination
of those payments.

The farmer-owner reserve is a stockpiling of certain crop commodities

originally established to both help farmers stretch out their marketing
periods during years of over-production, and to help consumers avoid
abrupt food shortages and higher prices. At present approximately 3.5
billion bushels of wheat and feed grains are in the reserve at an annual

storage cost of $0.6 billion. Capping this reserve system means prohi
biting another 600 million bushels of 1982-83 wheats and grains from

being stored, with an estimated outlay savings of $1.8 billion for the
two years combined, before the offsetting costs of farmers taking out in
creased non-recourse loans and then forfeiting their crops to the govern
58

ment.

The end estimated savings will be closer to $210 million for both

years combined, making this option seem like an exercise in futility.
Farmers will lose income and the government will gain little budgetary
savings.

Concerning the restriction of crop production, under current law the

government can and does withhold payments to farmers who refuse to cut
back on the percentage of designated acreage planted. It also pays farmers
to divert designated acreage to other production. Both of these tactics

are currently in use for 1982-83 crops in order to reduce overall crop

production, increase farm prices and decrease the government's outlays
59

for price supports.

The future strategy is mandatory acreage reduction

since the present system is voluntary, wasteful, and inefficient. Farmers

reduce only their least productive acreage usually, then find various
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other ways of receiving the benefits but still doing basically what

they want. Under mandatory divert and reduce rules up to 25% of

government designated acreage from each participating farmer would
be affected.

This would require specific congressional legislation, but
60

is estimated to save $5,9 billion in 1984-85, if enacted.

This policy

option would also mean a major, albeit temporary, increase in govern
ment intervention into the farming industry.

Under the present ad

ministration, this is unlikely (see Table V-13).
Other reductionist strategies include eliminating the wool and mohair

program, eliminating the honey-price support program, and putting the
peanut program on a no net—cost basis. Together these terminations
61

are estimated to save $794 million dollars between 1984-88.

How

ever, this savings will be at the expense of also reducing farmer incomes

with little other positive program interaction (see Table V-14).

Can Congress control entitlements other than the heavyweights and
interest on the public debt? Yes, if it is willing to enact structural

change legislation, including indexation adjustments, better targeting
of beneficiaries, control program interaction, and make other efforts.

However, the cost of such congressional action may be intolerably high
if the very nature of the programs are changed and the beneficiaries
are inordinately harmed.

Can the Social Security and Medicare/Medicaid entitlement spending
be controlled? Yes, but only to a relative degree without structural

reforms of their programs within the budget process. As long as, for example.

Social Security funding is automatically tied to indexation, the accom
panying inevitable rise in the number of beneficiaries will continue to
cause grand increases in Social Security outlays and obligations. All three
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TABLE V-13:

BUDGET SAVINGS FROM BROAD REDUCTION
STRATEGIES IN AGRICULTURAL PRICE

SUPPORT PROGRAMS (In billions of dollars)

Cumulative

Five-Year

Strategy

1984

1985

1986

1987

-3,540

1,935
3,580

3,540
3,380

1988

Savings

Reducing the Level
of Federal Support
Eliminate Defi

ciency Payments

Budget Authority
-Outlays
1,935

3,580
3,065 ,

9,055
15,500

Cap the FarmerOwned Reserve

Budget Authority
Outlays

"

--

--

110

—

--

110

110

--

__

__

__

no

—
-985

--290

-985
60

-290
200

60
1,135

-1,215
120

-450

-5,490

450
1,660

5,490
1,485

1,660
985 '

7,600
10,070

Reduce the Level

of Dairy Price

Support ay
Budget Authority
Outlays
Restricting Crop
Production

Budget Authority
Outlays

a.

Minus sign indicates an increase as compared with the baseline.

SOURCE: CBG, Deficit, '-83, p.140.
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TABLE

V-14: BUDGET SAVINGS FROM TARGETED REDUCTION
STRATEGIES IN AGRICULTURAL PRICE

SUPPORT PROGRAMS (In millions of dollars)

Cumulative

Five-Year

Options

1984

1985

1986

1987

'1988

Savings

Eliminate the Wool

and Mohair Program
Budget Authority
Outlays

65

76

318

76

85

85
92

92

65

96

414

33

36

38

107

33

36

38

40

41

188

38

38

38

114

38

38

38

38

38

190

Eliminate the Honey

Price Support Program
Budget Authority
Outlays
Place the Peanut

Program on a
No-Net-Cost Basis

Budget Authority
Outlays

SOURCE: CBO,Deficit, ^83, p. 145.
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of these large entitlements remain too dependent on the ebb and flow of
the economy and the fluctuations in the cost of living for other than
undisciplined expenditure increases to continue in both the short and long
runs. Unfortunately, the majority of the current strategies considered
here seek essentially cosmetic changes—singularly or in combination—

in these programs, rather than confronting the basic structures of the
Social Security and health care systems in this country. All of the
available evidence indicates these entitlements will continue to grow

unrestrained in the future (if they do not become insolvent first) with
out fundamental structural revisions in their makeup.

As shovm by the discussion of the present and immediate^future strategies

now being considered for controlling entitlement spending, individually
each program can have modifications implemented which will result in some
savings, based on either optimistic or pessimistic economic assumptions.

However, in almost all cases (the entitlement heavyweights and others) the

growth rate of spending for the programs are barely affected, and entitle
ment spending overall does not reverse its long-term expansion with the
non-structural strategies suggested. Even the structural alterations will

have difficulty effecting control for Congress over entitlement spending
because of the present unpredictabilities and uncertainties inherent in

our economic system. But the structural changes through the budgetary

process offer the only viable probability now and for the future for
Congress to gain the fiscal control they currently lack over entitlement
spending.

CHAPTER VI; CONCLUSIONS
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On April 20, 1983, President Reagan signed into law PL 98-21,. the
1

Social Security Reform Act.

The legislation contained all of the recom

mendations previously issued by the National Commission on Social Se

curity Reform, plus a few congressional additions, including a fundamen
tal change in the retirement age from 65 to 67 by the year 2027, and a
new accounting arrangement with the general Treasury. The bulk of the
Act's provisions are intended to raise revenues and broaden the base
of Social Security participation so that the system is kept solvent for
the short-term, and is re-established for the long-term.
None of the more radical structural options discussed in Chapter V

for controlling Social Security expenditures—eliminating the 1983-84
COLAS, or freezing them through 1988, for example—was enacted in the

reform legislation, since the aim was to save the system, not reduce

spending for it. But in spite of that, some of the enacted changes were
fundamental, structural transformations in benefit levels, age require
2

ments, and eligibility characteristics.

Because of that and the fact

that some of the Act's provisions will result in benefit cuts for reti

rees and, in effect, small cuts in future Social Security outlays, a

cogent argument can be made that the Reform Act was at least an effective
beginning to the establishment of governmental control of the future
growth of Social Security spending. These fundamental changes include

taxing one-half of the benefits for higher-income recipients, which while
primarily aimed at the approximately 40% of the Social Security elderly
who currently pay income taxes, will eventually affect the vast majority
of Social Security beneficiaries who receive other income. They also in

clude eliminating the windfall benefits accruing to workers who participate
in the Social Security system for only a short time, the changing of the

retirement age previously mentioned, and broadening the base of mandatory
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participation in the system (rather than voluntary, as it had been ) to
all new federal workers, all members of Congress, the president and vice-

president, and all federal judges. All of these, plus the permanent shift
of the COLA benefit to January, will produce outlay savings (see pages

77, 82-84 in the text), some primarily for the short-term (the next 5-7
years), and some, like the taxing of higher-income recipients, for the
long-term.

Coupled with the Act's stipulations for mandatory participation in the
Social Security system by the approximately 1 million non-profit organi
zation employees, the prohibition of state and local government employees

from withdrawing from the system, and the new accounting procedure with
the general Treasury—all virtually guaranteeing consistent increases in
the trust fund revenue base—Social Security expenditures have at least
been made more controllable , if not more controlled. Given the context

and the vigor of the political fight which was necessary to achieve even

these relatively mild, but very important changes in the Social Security

system, the Reform Act can be seen as one small but positive step—

perhaps the first stage of a longer process— in the direction of con
trolling spending for the biggest entitlement program of all.
The Reagan administration seems convinced, if but few others are,

that the reforms, at least the ones based solely on the commission's
recommendations, will help in the struggle to discipline entitlement

spending. Tables VI-1 and VI-2 show the administration's projections
(based on the assumptions shown in Chapter V) for future entitlement
expenditures, and the effect on Social Security spending of implementing
the commission's recommendations.
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TABLE VI-1;

The Reagan Budget Prq posals for Selected Entitlements, Fiscal ^84
(In Billions)_

General

Social security
Medicare

Civil service retirement

Military retirement
Other retirement
Total

Total as a share of GNP
Low-income
Medicaid

Unemployment compensation
Food stamps
Child nutrition

Supplemental security income
Aid to families with dependent children
Total

Total as a share of GNP

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

$154.1

$168.3

$191.8

$205.9

46.6
19.4
14.9
7.7

53.0
20.9
16.1
7.9

$178.2
59.8

$242.7

^266.2

8.0%
$17.4
23.8
11.0
4.6
7.7
8.0

$72.5
2.4%

1

8.3%

22.2
16.8
7.4

$280.4
8.0%

$19.4

$20.9

36.9
12.8
5.0
8.8
8.2
$91.1

28.8
11.7
4.6
7.8
7.5

2.9%

$81.3
2.3%

67.5
23.1
17.4
6.8
$306.6
8.1%

$23.2
25.9
11.6
4.7
8.6
7.4
$81.4

2.1%

74.5
25.0
18.4
7.7

$331.5
8.0%
$25.4
24.7
11.8
4.8
8.7
7.5
$82.9

^0%

1987
$223.1
83.4

26.5
19.3
7.3
$359.6
8.0%

1988

$236.8
93.1
28.1
20.1
8.0

$386.1
1.9

$27.9
23.7

$30.6
22.5

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

/

SOURCE: The Budget of the U.S., Fiscal 1984, Office of Management and Budget;
The National Journal, Vol. 6, February 5, 19.83, p. 271.
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TABLE VI-2; The Reagan Projected Impact of the. National Commission
Recommendations on Social Security Spending

(In Billions)

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

Total

OUTLAY REDUCTIONS

$4.0

$4.4

$4.7

$5.1

$5.4

$23.6

REVENUE INCREASES

8.3

5.6

8,9

10.7

22.3

55.7

$10.0 $13.6 $15.8 $27.7

$79.4

TOTAL SAVINGS

$12.2

SOURCE: The National Journal, Vol. 6, Feb., 5, 1983, p, 271.
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Although not technically passed as a fiscal 1984 reconciliation

measure, the Reform Act was decidedly a part of the larger congressio
nal budget process. Substantial action on Social Security had been
deferred during the budget discussions for fiscal 1982, after Congress

had rejected President Reagan's requests for Social Security cutbacks.
The passage of the Act for fiscal 1984 is thus a culmination of that
earlier postponement.

In addition to its provisions concerning Social Security, the Reform
A.ct also mandated the replacement of the existing Medicare procedure

for hospital cost reimbursement by a costs-determined-in advance pro
cedure based on standardized rates for specific kinds of patient treat

ments and conditions. This replacement is designed to motivate hospitals
and medical facilities to reverse their uncontrolled increases in medi
3

cal care expenses. The Act eliminated eligibility for Unemployment
Insurance benefits for non-professional employees of educational insti

tutions during their svimmer hiatus or other between term layoffs, when
those employees are reasonably certain to go back to work at the same

institution, among other UI adjustments. It also permanently shifted
the COLA for Supplemental Security Income beneficiaries to January.

These, and other combinations of structural and cosmetic adjustments,

though they are mainly modest-to-conservative changes, generally support
the thesis set forth in this paper. None of these changes by themselves

or even grouped together will turn the tide against uncontrollable en
titlement spending, but they do represent a solid beginning attempt,
and should be furthered as effective means toward the larger end of

congressional control of entitlement outlays growth.
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In summary, this thesis has examined entitlements as they are re
lated to the federal budget process and outcomes. It has defined exactly
what entitlements are, their nature within the budgetary process, the

major budgetary problems with entitlements, and CongressV current and
immediate future strategy options to deal with entitlements as part of

Congress' continuing package of budget uncontrollables. All of this has
been necessary to explore the major question posed by this paper: Is

Congress capable of controlling entitlement spending?

Control, in this thesis, has been defined as congressional ability,
under current law and the present structure of the budgetary process,

to enact effective constraints on the growth of federal spending for

entitlement programs. It is not seen as an issue of entitlement spending
growth versus no growth. Instead, the issue is undisciplined, unrestrai
ned growth versus the controlled, balanced growth of such spending. This

thesis has argued that without structural changes in the way entitlements
now fit within the budgetary process. Congress cannot control entitlement

spending. It is not just a lack of collective congressional will to tac
kle continued increases in entitlement spending that is the issue, but

rather a lack of real—as opposed to theoretical—structural capacity by
Congress to constrain the growth of entitlement spending.
The thesis has explored this central theme by emphasizing:

1. Entitlements, within the present federal budget, are special

status, relatively permanent programs providing benefits to

eligible individuals and governments who meet specified eligi

bility criteria. Entitlements provide benefits to help eligible
clients offset income losses to help those unable to care for

themselves, to make higher education, medical services and re
tirement income accessible to eligible recipients, etc. Currently
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there are some 35 major entitlement categories, and approximately
70 individual entitlement programs.

2.

Within the budgetary process, once Congress officially authorizes

a program as an entitlement, the program becomes virtually selfperpetuating and its funding automatic. The Appropriations process
becomes ineffective in constraining entitlement program outlays,

since the original authorizing legislation specifies eligibility
criteria, as-needed budget authority, and other characteristics

which obligate the government to finance the program based on

factors beyond congressional control (e.g., the rise in the elderly
population, high unemployment, etc.).
3.

There are three structural components associated with virtually

every entitlement program: indexation, program interaction and
the number of beneficiaries. They singly and in combination, are

most responsible for the lack of congressional control over in
creased entitlement spending.

4.

There are currently only two viable options available for Congress
to overcome its lack of control over entitlements: the reconcilia

tion procedure within the budgetary process, and structural changes
in the nature of entitlements within the budgetary process. Both

possess important advantages and disadvantages, the latter being
more dominant when either option is considered individually. In

combination, the two options offer the best probability for Con

gress to finally gain control over consistently increasing en
titlement spending.

5.

Currently and for the immediate future, though many reformintended strategies exist to reduce federal entitlement outlays
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and gain control over the impact of such outlay spending on the

federal budget deficit, without the implementation of structural
change plans within the budgeting process, the other strategies

are destined to make only minor alterations in annual entitle
ment increases in spending. In effect, massive federal obliga
tions for entitlements will remain unconstrained, undisciplined
and uncontrolled.

Is Congress currently capable of controlling entitlement spending?
As shown particularly in Chapter V, Congress does not now have the ca

pacity, without enacting major structural changes in either the origi
nal legislated authorizations or associated laws, to impose consistent,

long-term fiscal discipline on the Social Security entitlement. Medi
care and Medicaid, farm price supports, interest on the public debt,

and, to a certain extent, unemployment compensation—the entitlements
which for long have dominated government entitlement expenditures. Con
tinued adherence to convenient but non-structural and essentially cos

metic adjustments will continue to result in the habitual frustrating

consequences: an out-of-control budget deficit and continued instability,
heightened uncertainty and unrestrained, automatic growth in entitle
ment outlays. And yes. Congress does have the capacity to control most
of the means-tested programs, the GSL Program, General Revenue Sharing,

and Veterans' Programs, though to date there has been a very inconsis

tent demonstration of this capacity because of a persistent lack of
will (as defined by the continuing existence and clout of entitlement
client groups, for example, maintaining the political lack of congres
sional motivation or willingness to either enact long-term fiscal re
straints or dismantle entitlement programs ).
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What capacity Congress does have relative to controlling entitle
ments virtually depends on its effectively confronting, at the very
least, the basic entitlement factors of indexation, interaction and

number of beneficiaries through its reconciliation/budget process. And

whatever conrols Congress tries tp employ will also be heavily impacted
by the prevailing state of the nation's economy.
The governmental triumph called the Social Security Reform Act of
1983 should be considered as at least one model of a successful begin

ning strategy which can eventually lead to congressional control of
entitlement spending. Approval of the Act demonstrated the potential
of the kind of bipartisan political support which will be necessary
to attain that control.

For Congress indeed can control the growth of entitlement spending
in the federal budget. Hopefully it will decide to do so in ways which
will neither substantively gut present entitlement programs nor continue

to over-target the means-tested programs designed to help the poor.
There is an imperative to gain such control and soon. Otherwise, there

is a very real danger of budget uncontrollables, especially entitle
ments, actually becoming the entire budget.
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